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The coastal zone of Louisiana contains more than three million wetland acres, or about 
40 percent of the nation’s total. Since 1930, Louisiana has experienced a net loss of over 1,900 
square miles of coastal wetlands. Currently at risk are the remaining coastal wetlands, 80 percent 
of which are under private ownership. The acceptance of private wetland owners to restoration 
programs and their participation in these programs are critical if future coastal restoration efforts 
are to be successful. Gaining the cooperation by the coastal landowners, however, is complicated 
by the fact that while the public benefits accruing from wetland protection and restoration 
projects are likely to be large, private benefits are likely to be small and, potentially, negative.  
The primary goal of this research is to examine the factors that motivate private coastal 
landowners to participate in income-generating activities and the level of income derived from 
their coastal wetland parcels and with this understanding to assess current and potential policy 
instruments that might provide incentives for private coastal wetlands stewardship. 
Using data collected from a sample of coastal wetland owners, a double-hurdle model 
was used to econometrically identify the determinants on the participation and level of 
participation in income-generating activities. The results based on the estimated parameters and 
marginal effects confirmed that decisions to participate in income-generating activities and the 
level of participation are related to physical characteristics of the property and socioeconomic 




CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Background 
Louisiana’s coastal wetlands provide a variety of economic, ecological, cultural and 
recreational values to residents of the state and the coastal wetlands of south Louisiana are one of 
the most important, productive ecosystems in the United States. Benefits of coastal wetlands 
include flood control, shoreline protection, carbon storage, the provision of biological diversity, 
and supporting fishery and ecotourism industries (Costanza et al. 1997; Odum 1988; Pennings 
and Bertness 2001). The coastal zone of Louisiana includes more than three million wetland 
acres, or about 40% of the nation’s total. (Lipton et al. 1995; LOSCO, 2005). 
While Louisiana’s wetland acreage is vast, the state has experienced a net loss of over 
1,900 square miles (1,216,000 acres) of coastal wetlands since the 1930’s, representing an 
acceleration of 10 times the natural land loss rate (LCWCRTF and WCRA 1998; CPRA 2000; 
Britsch and Dunbar 1993). The estimated land loss rate has been in excess of 40 square miles per 
year during the past half century and between 25 and 35 square miles per year during the 
1990’s.1 This loss implies that wetlands revert to open water, thus causing shifts in land uses and 
ecological functions. There are a number of factors contributing to this loss. In part, natural 
evolutionary processes, including sea-level rise, land subsidence, erosion, saltwater intrusion, 
tropical storm, and hurricane impacts contribute to coastal wetland losses. Human disturbances 
also share a large part of the responsibility for the balance of wetland growth and decline. 
Historic decisions to levee the Mississippi and Atchafalaya rivers and to construct the Gulf 
                                                          
1 Barras et al. (2003) pointed out that the current land loss rate at an average of 24 square miles (15,360 acres) per 
year. The rate of coastal land loss in Louisiana represents 80% of the coastal wetland loss in the entire continental 




Intracoastal Waterway, ship channels, and access canals for hydrocarbon resource exploitation 
are primary reasons for the land loss. Channelization led to the redirection of alluvial sediments 
away from the coast, exacerbated erosion, and accelerated saltwater intrusion (Barras et al. 2003; 
Dunbar et al. 1992; LaCPRA 2007). These human-based forces have led to a situation where 160 
-200 million metric tons per year of sediments, once enriching the coastal wetlands, are now 
delivered directly onto the outer continental shelf (Caffey and Shexnayder 2003). Other factors, 
including upstream dams and soil conservation practices, have modified the movement of 
freshwater, suspended sediment, and made the coastal ecosystem more susceptible to saltwater 
intrusion have also contributed to the loss of these wetlands (Caffey et al. 2003).  
1.2 Problem Statement 
Without significant action, and based on the current loss rate, Louisiana will lose an 
estimated additional 800 thousand wetland acres by the year 2040 (Desmond, 2005). Wicker 
(1980, 1981) suggested that up to 60% of the Louisiana wetlands currently at risk can be 
managed to minimize further losses, mainly through the control of water flows and the 
restoration of coastal vegetation. More recently, Turner (1999) has suggested that small-scale 
projects, such as the construction of ‘artificial’ crevasses, spoil bank management, and terracing 
appear to be particularly cost effective in wetland restoration and creation efforts. While the 
technology necessary for management varies in complexity and cost (Spicer et al. 1986; Turner 
1999), in most cases solutions will either impact or be implemented on private lands. 
In 2006, over 2 million residents -more than 47% of the state’s population according to 
U.S. Census estimates- lived in Louisiana’s coastal parishes (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007). 




The acceptance of private wetland owners to restoration programs and their participation in these 
programs are critical if future coastal restoration efforts are to be successful. Gaining the 
cooperation by the coastal landowners, however, is complicated by the fact that while the public 
benefits accruing from wetland protection and restoration projects are likely to be large, private 
benefits (measured by changes in net income to the landowner) are likely to be small and, 
potentially, negative.2 The risk averse nature of the majority of coastal landowners (Dedah, 
2010) in conjunction with the relatively low income derived from surface-use activities suggest 
that, unless well-crafted to protect or enhance their private benefits, opposition by the 
landowners to publically funded restoration projects is likely to be high even if the expected 
public benefits associated with the project are large.3, 4  
1.3 Research Justification 
Roberts et al. (1999) report that across all wetland types (freshwater, brackish, and salt), 
two types of enterprises - alligator (including egg collection) and hunting (primarily the leasing 
of property for waterfowl hunting) - comprise the vast majority of surface-based revenues.5 In 
light of this situation, this dissertation proposes to develop a comprehensive framework for 
understanding the motivation among coastal landowners to participate in either or both of these 
enterprises and the physical characteristics of the property and socioeconomic characteristics of 
                                                          
2 Small private benefits from a publically-funded restoration project are the outcome when property changes 
associated with that project yield only marginal positive income changes to the landowner. Negative private benefits 
accrue when the landowner’s post-project income as a result of project implementation is reduced. 
3 Dedah (2010) found that almost three-quarters of coastal wetland owners exhibited risk-averse behavior. 
4 Based on a 1998 study by Roberts et al. (1999), net income derived from surface-use activities of the coastal 
wetlands ranged from a high of $2.25 for freshwater marsh to a low of $0.37 for saltwater marsh. Furthermore, 40% 
of the owners of freshwater marsh and 67% of the owners of saltwater marsh reported losses. 
5 Many of the coastal properties also yield considerable sub-surface revenues associated with the extraction of oil 
and gas. Only the surface revenues are considered in this study with the exception that, as discussed later, sub-





the landowner that determine the intensity of participation (and, as such, the expected returns 
from participation). Beginning with a theoretical model of private decision making with spatial 
heterogeneity, landowners are surveyed as a part of this dissertation to obtain information about 
their socioeconomic characteristics, including attitudes toward the use of their properties for 
income-based activities, attributes of their properties, revenues derived from their properties 
(associated with the two enterprises), and attitudes towards coastal restoration projects. Next, this 
research proposes to analyze the participation rate and the intensity of participation (i.e., 
revenues generated from the two enterprises) with respect to the combination of physical 
characteristics associated with the individual parcels and the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
wetland owner. As discussed in the Approach section, this will be accomplished using a double-
hurdle decision model where the first ‘hurdle’ considers the participation decision (yes, no) and 
the second hurdle provides an estimate of revenues conditioned on the outcome of the first 
hurdle. This analysis will be conducted for the two enterprises.6 Finally, the results for the 
implications regarding the use of various policy instruments to determine the likelihood of 
acceptance among landowners to these various instruments and landowner’s willingness to 
participate in wetland restoration programs are evaluated. Importantly, an attempt will be made 
to tailor these instruments to the specific activities, environments, and characteristics of 
landowners in coastal Louisiana. 
Federal laws and programs recognize that the best stewards of coastal resources are likely 
to be local communities and their citizens.7  State and federal budgets to encourage local 
                                                          
6 As mentioned before, the two enterprises include alligator and waterfowl hunting. 
7 For example, the National Estuary Program (NEP) encourages local communities to take responsibility for 
managing estuaries and maintaining the wide range of biophysical, economic, recreational, and aesthetic values of 
the systems. Much of the monetary and technical resources for these efforts come from federal and state programs, 




stewardship, however, are relatively small in relation to needs. Consequently, if coastal 
restoration and management needs are to be met in Louisiana, public funds must be leveraged to 
private investment. Encouraging this private investment can be difficult because of the 
uncertainty as to the impact of any project on the income-generating potential of a given project, 
the spatially complex nature of expected wetland losses, and the fact that the benefits of wetland 
restoration tend to accrue to the public rather than to individual landowners. The overriding goal 
of this project is to add to our limited knowledge of coastal wetland income-generating activities 
and to use this increased knowledge to help craft restoration program scenarios that are more 
likely to be accepted by wetland owners and in which they will be more willing to actively 
participate. 
1.4 Study Objectives 
The overall goal of the proposed research is to develop a theoretical and empirical model 
of the factors that motivate private landowners to participate in and generate surface-based 
income from their coastal wetland property and, with this understanding, to value potential 
policy instruments that provide incentives for private coastal wetlands stewardship. Specific 
objectives include: 
1. Determine the characteristics of coastal Louisiana landowners, including their attitudes 
toward the use of their property for income-generating activities, the actual use of their 
wetland holdings as a source of income-generating activities, knowledge and opinions 
regarding cost-sharing programs, and their general socioeconomic profile;8  
                                                          
8 More than 5 million acres of coastal wetlands are contained in Louisiana's coastal zone with approximately 80 
percent of this 5 million acres held privately. These percentages, in addition to ongoing state-level efforts at large-




2. Determine the physical characteristics of the wetland properties, including type of 
wetland, total acreage of different marsh types, and presence of a hunting lodge/camp, 
etc.;  
3. Estimate, using a double-hurdle modeling approach, the importance of specific property 
and landowner characteristics on participation rates and the intensity of participation (i.e., 
the level of income-generating activities) in the two primary enterprises conducted on 
coastal Louisiana wetland properties (i.e., alligator and waterfowl hunting enterprises); 
and  
4. Based on results from the preceding objectives, assess the potential impact of policy 
instruments designed to encourage private landowners to participate in cost-sharing and 
other federally sponsored projects that would maintain/enhance their coastal wetland 
holdings.  
1.5 Dissertation Structure 
The dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction and 
problem statement, highlighting the study objectives and theoretical and policy related 
contributions. To accomplish these objectives, the remainder of the dissertation is organized as 
follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature relevant to this dissertation topic, including studies 
which analyse those factors that contribute to landowner participation in various programs. 
Chapter 3 presents the development of a theoretical model describing a landowner’s participation 
decision. The double-hurdle model approach and logic of the research method is presented in 
Chapter 4. Issues of survey and data validity are considered in Chapter 5, including sampling 




results while Chapter 7 provides a brief summary of the findings and evaluates the potential 
















CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
Understanding landowners interest and requirements for participation in income-
generating activities is one aspect of the planning process. Another aspect of the process is 
identifying the private landowner and their wetland characteristics that are conducive to income-
generating activities. Research exploring private landowners attitudes towards coastal wetland 
restoration and maintenance in Louisiana is limited. While limited, some studies have been 
conducted that identify those factors considered by private landowners to be important in the 
conservation and restoration decision-making process. In general, previous studies indicate that a 
landowner’s decision whether to participate in land-related activities (such as ecosystem 
conservation and wetland restoration program) is affected by a wide range of economic, 
geographic, and sociological factors. To further understand the most important factors 
influencing a landowner’s participation decision, this chapter reviews some of public regulations 
and academic studies related to various restoration programs. The following section provides 
some of the laws and regulations which notably impact wetland conservation. Section 2.3 briefly 
reviews the current wetland restoration efforts and potential policy instruments in coastal 
Louisiana, while Section 2.4 provides a review of relevant studies that explore factors which 
contribute to a landowner’s participation decision process. A brief summary be set up in Section 
2.5. 
2.2 Policies and Programs Related to Wetland 
Over the past 40 years, the U.S. population has increasingly begun to recognize that 




shoreline stabilization, and fish and wildlife habitat. The importance of wetlands has been 
prioritized, to some extent, by federal, state, and local policies encouraging their protection. 
Thus, the policy features and regulatory factors that influence landowners participation must be 
considered. A brief introduction of some regulations and programs is given in this section. 
The Clean Water Act 
Yaich (2011) pointed out that the essential wetland protection legislation was initiated in 
1972 with the passage of the Clean Water Act. This Act regulated the dredging and filling of 
waters of the United States, including wetlands, and has required the replacement of wetlands 
lost to development under a policy now known as “no net loss of wetlands policy”. No net loss 
was first adopted as a national policy in 1988 under George H. W. Bush administration. The goal 
of the policy is to balance wetland loss due to economic development with wetlands reclamation, 
mitigation, and restorations efforts so that each newly impacted wetland has to be replaced with a 
wetland of the same size and with similar wetland functions and values (NWPF 1987).9 Section 
404 of the Clean Water Act is the primary vehicle for Federal regulation to deal with wetland 
issues.  
There are a number of U.S. government agencies that are in some way legislatively 
mandated to ensure the protection of wetlands. These agencies include: (1) the Department of 
Defense, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps); (2) the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA); (3) the Department of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); (4) the 
Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA); and (5) 
                                                          
9 Turner et al. (2001) highlight that simple ratios of area do not indicate equivalent replacement of functions based 
on different types of mitigation (creation, restoration, enhancement, or preservation) and each different mitigation 




and the Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) (Votteler 
1996). 
The Corps and the EPA share the responsibility for issuing permits to those individuals 
who wish to dredge or fill wetlands, and these permits often require “compensatory mitigation” 
under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act (Hough and Robertson 2009). However, the EPA has 
the authority to veto the permit if discharge materials at the selected sites would adversely affect 
such things as municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas, wildlife, or recreational 
resources. The FWS and NOAA provide the Corps and the EPA with comments about the 
potential environmental effects of pending Section 404 permits. 10 
The Farm Bill  
The 1985 Farm Bill was the first act that officially established the Conservation Reserve 
Program (CRP) aimed to slow wetland loss to agricultural conversion (Hayden, 1990). The CRP 
is a cost-share and rental payment program under the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and is administered by the USDA Farm Service Agency (FSA). 
The USDA Forest Service and the USDA Natural Resources Conservation Service 
(NRCS) provide technical assistance for CRP. NRCS's natural resources conservation programs 
provide assistance with respect to reducing soil erosion, enhancing water supplies with 
groundwater recharge, improving water quality, increasing wildlife habitat, and reducing 
damages caused by floods and other natural disasters (O'Brien, 2008). The CRP encourages 
farmers to convert highly erodible cropland or other environmentally sensitive acreage to 
                                                          




vegetative cover, such as cultivated or native bunchgrasses and grasslands, wildlife and 
pollinators food and shelter plantings, windbreak and shade trees, filter and buffer strips, grassed 
waterways, and riparian buffers. 
The Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) was established by the 1990 Farm Bill (including 
a major change to the CRP) and expanded the list of eligible lands to include marginal pasture 
lands converted to wetlands or established as wildlife habitat. The WRP was a voluntary 
program offering landowners the opportunity to protect, restore, and enhance wetlands on their 
property. NRCS provided technical and financial support to help landowners with their wetland 
restoration efforts through WRP. 
The new Farm Bill, enacted on February 7, 2014, merged the former Wetlands Reserve 
Program, Grasslands Reserve Program, and Farm and Ranchlands Protection Program into a new 
program called the Agricultural Conservation Easement Program (ACEP).11 Funding for wetland 
and grassland protection expired Sept. 30, 2013, and the 2014 Farm Bill reinstates funding for 
these critical efforts under ACEP (NRCS, 2014). The ACEP provides financial and technical 
assistance to help conserve agricultural lands and wetlands and their related benefits. Under the 
Wetlands Reserve Easements component, NRCS helps to restore, protect and enhance enrolled 
wetlands. Under the wetland reserve enrollment options, NRCS may enroll eligible land through: 
 Permanent Easements: conservation easements in perpetuity. NRCS pays 100 percent of 
the easement value for the purchase of easement and the restoration costs; 
 30-Year Easement -easements that expires after 30 years. Under 30-year easements, 
NRCS pays 50 to 75 percent of the easement value for the purchase of the easement. 
                                                          




Additionally, NRCS pays between 50 to 75 percent of the restoration costs; 
 Term Easements - easements that are for the maximum duration allowed under applicable 
State laws. NRCS pays 50 to 75 percent of the easement value for the purchase of the 
term easement. Additionally, NRCS pays between 50 to 75 percent of the restoration 
costs; or  
 30-Year Contracts - available only to enroll acreage owned by Indian tribes, and program 
payment rates are commensurate with 30-year easements. 
Swampbuster 
Swampbuster is a provision of the Food Security Act of 1985 (were introduced in the 
1985 Farm Bill, with amendments in 1990, 1996 and 2002). The Swampbuster provisions are 
intended to discourage the conversion of wetlands to agricultural production use. Farmers will be 
ineligible for all or a portion of certain federal farm program benefits, including loans, subsidies, 
crop insurance, and price support programs if he/she converting a wetland area to produce an 
agricultural commodity after November 28, 1990 unless an exemption applies or the functions of 
the wetland that was converted (Lamunyon, 1994). 
The Water Bank Act 
The Water Bank Act (WBA) represents federal legislation enacted to promote the 
preservation of U.S. wetlands (Beckman 1971). The Act authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture 
to enter into land restriction agreements with landowners and operators to preserve wetlands and 
retire adjoining agricultural lands. The agreements (contracts) are entered into for a period of 10 
years and can be renewed at the time of expiration. In return, the landowners are entitled to 




(Act, Endangered Species 1973). The annual maximum payments increased from $10 million to 
$30 million after 1980. Authorized by WBA, the Water Bank Program (WBP) aims to (1) 
preserve and improve wetland as habitat for migratory waterfowl and other wildlife; (2) conserve 
surface waters; (3) reduce soil and wind erosion; (4) contribute to flood control; (5) improve 
water quality; (6) improve subsurface moisture; and (7) enhance the natural beauty of the 
landscape.  
The North American Wetlands Conservation Act 
To preserve North American wetland ecosystems, waterfowl, and the other migratory 
birds, fish, and wildlife, the United States Congress passed the North American Wetlands 
Conservation Act (NAWCA) in December 13, 1989. This act authorizes a wetlands habitat 
program to protect, restore, and manage wetland ecosystems and associated habitats for 
migratory birds and other wetland wildlife in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service is responsible for facilitating these funding. The program 
encourages private-public cost-sharing through standard and small grants programs. The 
standard grants program supports projects in all three countries and the small grants program 
supports only conservation projects in the U.S. Funds contribute towards conservation projects 
not eligible to match if it comes from the U.S. federal sources (Wilson et al. 1997).12 The 
appropriation authorization for NAWCA may not exceed $75 million for FY 2007 through FY 
2012. Funding for NAWCA expired in September 2012. 
                                                          




2.3 Wetland Restoration Status in Louisiana  
2.3.1 Current Wetland Restoration Efforts in Louisiana 
In an effort to address the problem of Louisiana’s coastal land loss, the U.S. Congress 
passed the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) in 1990. The 
CWPPRA program has allocated more than $1.5 billion for construction and operation of 
projects since in 1990. In 1998, the COAST 2050 report estimated that an additional $14 billion 
was needed to address Louisiana’s land loss problem. In 2002, the Louisiana Coastal Area 
(LCA) Restoration Program requested that $14 billion, but only $1.9 billion was authorized in 
2004 through the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA). Furthermore, attempts to get 
federal royalties from petroleum activities off the state’s outer continental shelf (OCS) were 
unsuccessful until 2005, when a one-time payment of $540 million was allocated to Louisiana 
under the Coastal Impact Assistance Program (CIAP). In 2007, the Gulf of Mexico Energy 
Security Act (GOMESA) approved more OCS revenue, and it is now projected that the state will 
receive $210 million annually through 2017 and $650 million annually after 2017. Despite these 
increases, the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) recently estimated that $100 
billion would be needed to fully integrate coastal restoration and protection (Graves 2009). 
Given current sources of projected funding, that means that Louisiana will have only 13% of the 
funds needed to accomplish its coastal wetland restoration goals (Wang, 2012). 
2.3.2 Potential Policy Instruments in Louisiana 
Not all policy options are equally effective in achieving desired social goals given the 
alternative enterprises and the influence of different property characteristics and socioeconomic 




landowners resources, opportunities, and attitudes increases, the complexity of the response to a 
given policy will also increase. This may require that policy instruments be tailored to specific 
landowner and property characteristics. In practice, the effectiveness of public goals to 
encourage private coastal restoration efforts may depend upon more than just a simple method of 
making transfer payments. In particular, it may be more effective to implement a portfolio of 
policy instruments to increase the range of options available for private landowners (Caffey et al. 
2003). The reason for this is that private landowners with different situations are likely to exhibit 
heterogeneous preferences over a range of relevant land use alternatives. A wide range of 
management approaches have been proposed for the general problems of land and water 
conservation and ecosystem restoration in the United States (USEPA 1999). General categories 
of these approaches, with some specific examples relevant to coastal Louisiana, include: 
 Public land purchases. Federal programs such as the Coastal Wetland Planning, 
Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) and the Land and Water Conservation Fund 
(LWCF) have enabled the purchase and restoration of a small percentage of the coastal 
wetlands in Louisiana. Many private landowners, however, may be reluctant to sell their 
properties, preferring other means of achieving restoration goals. 
 Public purchase of permanent or temporary conservation easements. Federal programs 
located in the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce provide small levels 
of funding for the purchase of conservation easements on private coastal wetland 
properties. 
 Establishing new markets for land. One existing but underutilized approach is the 
establishment of wetland mitigation banks through which credits for wetland restoration 




carbon credits; brackish marshes such as those in the Louisiana coastal zone are believed 
to have a good potential for carbon sequestration. 
 Implementing innovative tax incentive programs. One potential incentive scheme 
involves severing, where needed, surface and subsurface property rights so that oil and 
gas producers may continue to exploit subsurface minerals but also may take advantage 
of reduced taxes for undertaking surface restoration efforts. A second example in this 
category would be shifting towards the taxing of land activities and not property size 
(Seidemann and Susman 2002). This latter approach is a landowner-specific approach 
that could be developed and refined using the results of this research. 
 Subsidies for plant, fish, and wildlife management. Examples include bounties on the 
eradication of nuisance species, such as nutria (Myocastor coypus), an herbivorous rodent 
whose behavior is extremely destructive of wetlands. Another example includes 
programs to compensate landowners for conserving protected species, such as the US 
Fish and Wildlife Service’s Private Stewardship Grants Program. 
2.4 General Factors Affecting Landowner’s Participation  
2.4.1 Factors Affecting Landowner’s Participation in Wetland Restoration Programs 
While literature examining participation in Federal/State wetland-restoration sponsored 
programs among Louisiana landowners is limited, multiple studies have looked specifically at 
wetland restoration program participation at a larger scale (i.e., the United States and other 
countries) as well as in other states within the United States. Based on county acreage enrolled in 
the Wetland Trees Practice of Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), Parks and Kramer (1995) 




farmer participation in wetland restoration programs in the United States. The authors employed 
a logit model to identify factors which may influence the decision among farm operators whether 
or not to enroll in wetland-related practices. They pointed out that, in general, opportunity costs, 
program payments, and land quality were all statistically significant in determining enrollments 
and the model explained roughly half of the variability in enrollment. Results from the analysis 
suggest that farmers become less likely to participate in wetland restoration program as income 
derived from agriculture production increases. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for government payments variable indicated that the amount of government payments 
received per acre is associated with higher participation. The authors suggested that age and 
ownership were also important factors in the participation decision. Involvement in wetland 
restoration programs was positively related to the age of the farmers as well as the proportion of 
land operated by full or part-time farmers.  
Pease et al. (1997) randomly selected 305 individuals from 2,500 landowners who 
participated in three wetland restoration programs (the WRP, the Emergency Wetland Reserve 
Program, and the Partners for Fish and Wildlife Program) within states to determine  landowners 
attitudes towards wetland restoration for the purpose of outlining  potential improvements 
associated with  future restoration programs. This research explored demographic and farm 
characteristics of participants in these program. Most landowners in this survey had small and 
medium sized properties, and most landowners earned 20% or less of their income from 
farming.13 From this survey, the authors found that wildlife plays an extremely important role in 
attracting landowners to restore wetlands. Eighty-four percent of the respondents reported that 
providing habitat for wildlife was extremely important in their decision to restore a wetland tract. 
                                                          




The authors pointed that altruistic considerations pertaining to wildlife, future generations, and 
natural beauty were very important factors affecting landowner’s restoration decisions. Although 
90% of the landowners in the survey reported receiveing financial assistance for wetland 
restoration, only 10% reported this factor to be extremely important in their decision to 
participate in wetland restoration. The authors suggest that high variation in the attitudes among 
landowners with respect to receiving financial assistance indicated that a reduction in easement 
payments or help with restoration would decrease the likelihood of participation. After 
examining landowners opinions as to why other landowners do not participate in wetland 
restoration activities, the authors found that “dislike of government programs” and “unaware of 
restoration programs” were the primary reasons.  
Forshay et al. (2005), based on data covering four counties in south-central Wisconsin, 
examined ecological monitoring data in relation to perceptions among landowners regarding  the 
federally funded Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP). As a part of this study, the researchers 
surveyed former and current landowners to assess landowner satisfaction with the restoration 
process, participation in planning and implementation, reasons to enroll in the WRP, and 
activities within the restoration sites. The authors assumed that economic and ecological factors 
were related to satisfaction and pointed out that participation in the WRP was influenced by 
perceived opportunity costs, program payments, and land quality. Survey results indicated that 
an increase in agricultural benefits tended to decrease participation while an increase in the net 
benefits of wetland restoration increased participation. Landowners opinions and satisfaction 
with the program were also found to influence restoration participation. In addition, the authors 
employed logistic and ordinal logistic regression models to identify factors influencing a 




motivated landowners to enroll in the WRP including: (1) protection of the environment, (2) 
economic incentives, and (3) recreational opportunities. The recreational opportunities reflected 
nonmonetary benefits such as recreation and protection of land, and that these nonmonetary 
benefits were weighted more heavily than other factors by landowners when deciding whether to 
participate in the WRP program. 
Concerning risk perception, Dedah (2010) investigated the factors that influence private 
landowners to invest in coastal wetland restoration and maintenance activities in Louisiana. He 
surveyed private coastal landowners to determine their general socioeconomic characteristics, 
attitudes toward risks, attitudes toward wetland conservation, current uses of landholdings, and 
previous investments in wetland restoration and maintenance projects. Based on this survey data, 
he used two econometric models - the Tobit and double-hurdle model, to determine how various 
factors influence the probability and the level of investment in coastal restoration.14 A likelihood 
ratio test was then employed to determine which of the two specifications was, from a statistical 
viewpoint, more appropriate. Based on the results from the likelihood ratio test, the researcher 
concluded that the double-hurdle model was the appropriate model with the implication being 
that the decision to invest in wetland restoration and the level of investment are determined by 
different processes. The double-hurdle results indicated that degree of risk aversion plays an 
important role in landowner’s decisions to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance 
activities. Specifically, the level of investment in wetland restoration and maintenance projects 
decreases in association with the level of risk averseness exhibited by the landowner. 
Furthermore, landowners with properties in risk-prone areas along the coast were found to be 
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less likely to invest in wetland restoration than among those landowners with properties in less 
risk prone areas. In addition, factors including property size, attitudes toward wetland 
restoration and maintenance, income related to the property, participation in government 
wetland programs, ownership structure, and land use were found to significantly influence a 
landowner’s decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance in coastal Louisiana. 
In an international context, Söderqvist (2003) used a mail questionnaire instrument from 
a random sample of 200 Swedish farmers who live in the Kavlinge River drainage basin to 
determine the willingness to participate in a catchment-based program for wetland creation in an 
agricultural district in Southern Sweden. Based on data obtained from this survey, the author 
examined farmer’s motivations to participate in this program using a Probit regression model. 
Four groups of explanatory variables, scale of farm operation characteristics, geographical 
location of the farm, the farmer’s characteristics, and subjective values and beliefs, were 
considered in the model. The results from the Probit regression analysis indicated that 
perceptions of public environmental benefits was an important factor influencing a farmer’s 
willingness to participate. These perceptions were in turn likely to depend on a farmer’s 
knowledge of how nature works and what information he/she had received. The results also 
showed that attitudes and perceived advantages and disadvantages were important factors in 
determining a farmer’s willingness to participate in the wetland restoration program, while the 
factor more associated with farm profitability was not found to significantly influence the 
likelihood of participation. The author pointed out that perceived advantages and disadvantages 
would have a strong impact if private agricultural benefits were the dominant motive for 




study concluded that besides financial factors, private and public environmental benefits were 
also important related to participation decisions. 
To quantify perceived costs among landowners within the Prairie Pothole Region of 
Saskatchewan in Canada, Yu and Belcher (2011) estimated the compensation required for 
private landowners to conserve wetland and riparian zones and evaluated the influence of farm 
characteristics and landowner attitudes on conservation decisions. They surveyed a total of 4,110 
landowners in two distinct regions and the overall effective response rate for the two study sites 
was 6.1% resulting in a total of 212 completed surveys used for economic analysis. Two 
econometric models, a binary Probit model and a multinomial Probit model, were employed to 
evaluate the willingness to accept compensation for conserving riparian areas based on a 
proposed 10-year payment program. Results from the binary and multinomial Probit analyses 
suggested that the magnitude of the conservation payment was an important factor driving a 
landowner’s conservation adoption decision. A one dollar per acre increase in the annual 
conservation payment was found to increase the probability of acceptance of the payment by 
0.6% and 0.8% for the binary model and multinomial Probit model, respectively. The variable 
farm size was found to significantly influence the likelihood of participation in both models. The 
results indicated that landowners of small farms (defined as land area less than average farm size 
of 1,719 acres) were more willing to adopt the wetland conservation contract than other 
landowners. Farmers perceptions of private costs and benefits associated with the wetlands were 
also found to influence attitudes toward conservation. Farmers who believe wetlands are 
beneficial and provide a perceived private benefit were found to be more likely to participate in 
the conservation program and/or would be willing to do so for a lower payment. The coefficient 




significant in the multinomial Probit model, suggesting that landowners who believe that 
wetlands are important for wildlife will be less willing to adopt wetland conservation. The 
authors found that the age of the landowner did not significantly influence the landowners’ 
decisions in the binary Probit model, while age was found to significantly and negatively impact 
on the probability of adopting wetland and riparian conservation in the uncertain multinomial 
response model. This implied that younger landowners were more likely to participate in wetland 
conservation program, while older landowners were less likely to adopt wetland and riparian 
conservation. This research also suggested that financial incentives might be quite costly and 
ineffective if it was the only policy in use. 
In the same time period, Zhang et al. (2011) examined the main factors that influence 
farmer’s willingness to participate in the conversion of cultivated land to wetlands (CCW) 
among farmers in Northern China. A total of 330 households were randomly selected in 11 
villages that were chosen from the list of households provided by the Sanjiang National Nature 
Reserve (NNR) Administration. This study received a high response rate (94%) by using face-to-
face interview with a local manager cooperation. Of the distributed questionnaires, 310 
completed surveys were returned. Based on the data collected from the questionnaire, a binary 
logistic regression analyses was used to determine which factors influenced farmer’s willingness 
to participation in the CCW project. The results indicated that age had a negative impact in 
explaining the level of participation, implying that older famers were less likely to participate in 
restoration project. The level of education was found to have a positive influence on the 
probability of participation. Farmers without cultivated land and/or with lower annual income 
were also found to exhibit more positive attitudes towards wetland restoration. This study also 




determining participation. The amount of cultivated land and geographical location influenced 
the main income sources of local farmers. The results indicated that attitudes whether or not to 
support the restoration project were associated with farmers’ agricultural lifestyle and economic 
conditions. The results further showed that farmers perceptions towards the benefits and risks 
associated with wetland restoration implied that individuals had different perceptions and 
attitudes towards the CCW project. Farmers were more positive to the restoration project if they 
were aware of the benefits associated with their participation and were more aggressive to the 
project if they paid more attention to risks associated with their participation. Furthermore, the 
authors pointed out that it would encourage famers participation if the government provide fair 
compensation. 
More recently, Guan et al. (2015) explored whether a farmer’s willingness to participate 
in Poyang lake wetland restoration (the largest freshwater lake in China and one which provides 
a large buffer for flood management in several provinces in the Middle and Eastern China as 
well as providing wildlife habitat) was influenced by information about wetland functions and 
benefits. The in-person interviews, which included a wetland educational video, drawn from a 
random sample of 1,009 individuals with farms in and around the wetlands were conducted by 
the China Agricultural Survey Service Jiangxi Field Office. Information collected during the 
interview process included each farmer’s attitude to participate in wetland restoration program 
before and after watching the education video, as well as each farmer’s socioeconomics and 
demographics characteristics. In this survey, a farmer’s willingness to participate was measured 
in a 5-point Likert scale (with 1 indicating extremely not willing to participate and 5 indicating 




using the paired t-test as well as the propensity score matching (PSM) approach.15 This study 
suggested that after watching the video, willingness to participate in the restoration project  
improved by one level (from “willing” to “extremely willing” with the increase from one level to 
the next being statistically significant). Furthermore, ordered Probit and a binary Probit analyses 
were conducted to investigate how individual farmer characteristics and/or farmer household 
attributes may influence willingness to participate and the information treatment, respectively. 
Results from ordered Probit regression analysis indicated that information was found to 
significantly and positively affect willingness to participate. In addition, gender, number of 
seniors in the household and number of migrant days away from home were found to positively 
associate with willingness to participate while number of agricultural laborers in the household 
and farmland size were found to negatively associate with willingness to participate. The authors 
concluded that education information has a positive effect on the program participation and 
suggested that government educational program could effectively enhance farmer participation in 
the wetlands restoration program.  
2.4.2 Factors Affecting Landowner’s Participation in Different Conservation Programs 
Aside from the above studies that focused on wetlands, a number of other studies have 
been conducted examining those factors leading to participation in various land conservation 
programs. Kraft et al. (1996) explored farmer’s willingness to participate in the USDA’s Water 
Quality Incentive Program (WQIP), which was held as the centerpiece of the 1990 farm bill’s 
nonpoint source reduction mandate. From a selected sample of 2,067 farmers whose properties 
are critical for surface or groundwater quality located in ten diverse counties in the Corn Belt 
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Region (Midwestern United States), a total of 770 completed surveys were returned and used for 
economic analysis (an  overall effective response rate of 37%). Based on this survey data, the 
authors employed a binomial logistic regression analysis to determine the factors influencing a 
farmer’s willingness to participate in the WQIP. Results from the regression analysis indicated 
that (1) farmers' attitudes toward governmental involvement with wetland regulation; (2) 
education; (3) tenure status; (4) contact with Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS); 
and (5) percentage of farm sales derived from specialty crops were found to significantly 
influence the likelihood of participate in the WQIP. Specifically, more educated farmers who had 
more positive attitudes toward wetland regulations, who had more contact with an NRCS expert, 
and who had a larger percentage of their gross farm income from specialty crops were  more 
likely to participate in restoration programs. Meanwhile, private landownership was found to 
have a positive impact on the willingness to participate in incentive programs. The authors 
pointed out that trust plays an important role for landowners to participate in the NRCS-
sponsored WQIP. 
By using the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) annual data from 2001 
to 2003, Lambert et al. (2007) determined the factors that influence a farm household’s decision 
to participate in conservation programs. A cumulative Probit regression was used to determine 
the likelihood of participation. For analysis, the variables including the business, operator, and 
household characteristics of farms and three practices group were constructed for comparison 
purpose.16 In addition, the authors employed a multinomial logit regression to determine the 
factors of farm structure, household, and environmental characteristics that influence a 
                                                          





landowner’s decision whether or not to participate in the conservation practices. Results from the 
cumulative Probit regression analysis indicated that cattle/dairy, cost/output ratio, tenure, off-
farm income share, retired, dual off-farm income, share income with other household, wetland, 
and manufacturing share, were found to significantly influence the likelihood of a farm operator 
using one or more conservation techniques. Results from the multinomial logit regression 
analysis indicated that variables: high value crops, grain crop, hogs, asset turnover ratio, 
commodity payments, female operator, operator works off farm, spouse works off-farm, dual off-
farm income, retired, and manufacturing, were found to significantly influence the likelihood of 
a farm operator participating in conservation practices. This research suggested that smaller 
farms and specialty operators were less likely to participate in intensive practices but were more 
interested in flexible practices.17 Furthermore, the authors pointed out that the expert advice 
plays an important role in prompting participation in specialized conservation practices. 
A body of literature also examines those factors hypothesized to influence participation in 
forest management and investment decisions among nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) 
landowners (Greene and Blatner, 1986; Romm et al. 1987; Bliss and Martin, 1990; Nagubandi et 
al. 1996; Erickson et al. 2002; Elwood et al. 2003). Joshi and Arano (2009) extended the 
emphasis of landowner studies and investigated landowners participation decision in several 
forest management activities.18 The authors used a mail survey from a randomly selected sample 
of NIPF landowners of West Virginia and achieved a response rate of 20%. A binary logistic 
regression was employed for each of the activities to determine the factors affecting an NIPF 
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landowner’s decision. The results suggested that the model used for property management 
activities explained 31% of the variation, while the models explained less than 30% variation for 
the other three activities. Meanwhile, variables including landowner characteristics, ownership, 
and management characteristics were found to significantly influence the probability of the 
participation decisions.19  
A study by Matta et al. (2009) observed the willingness among Florida non-industrial 
private forest owners to participate in a conservation program that required restrictions beyond 
the existing regulations for silvicultural best management practices (BMPs) in return for 
financial incentives. The authors used a random sample of 1,500 landowners in four counties in 
North Florida who owned at least ten acres of land.20 This research employed a multinomial logit 
model to determine the factors affecting the probability of participation. The results from the 
regression analysis indicated that age, income, education, years of ownership, property location, 
place of residence, and membership of forestry were found to significantly influence 
participation. Specifically, more educated younger owners who had a higher incomes and had 
more years of forestland ownership were more likely to participate in forest practices. 
Landowners who were a member of forestry or conservation organization and lived on the 
property and the land located rural area, were found to have a higher probability of engaging in a 
conservation program. In addition, the authors found that the mean incentive payment was about 
$95 per ha per year and found that the mean willingness to accept payments ranged from $37 to 
$151 /ha/year. 
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In terms of voluntary programs targeting resource conservation on private land, 
Kauneckis and York (2009) examined private landowner participation in voluntary forest 
conservation programs.21 From a random sample of 7,780 landowners, a total of 490 landowners 
were interviewed by a research team in Monroe County with an overall effective response rate of 
53%.  A binary logistic regression was employed to evaluate the factors that influence the 
probability of participation. In order to account for problems associated with endogeneity, two 
different two-stage models were employed for mixed agriculture, forest and residential uses 
(AFR), and mix forest and residential uses (FR), respectively. Results from the binary logistic 
regression analysis suggested that variables: total other acres owned in state, parcel size, 
membership in non-forest program, and distance to urban area, were found to significantly 
influence the probability of participation in voluntary forest conservation programs. The two-
stage regression model from AFR land use suggested that variables: total other acres owned in 
state, parcel size, membership in non-forest program, distance to urban area, and forest acres, 
were found to significantly influence the probability of participation in voluntary forest 
conservation programs for AFR land use. The two-stage regression model from FR land use 
suggested that variables: total other acres owned in state, membership in non-forest program, 
and distance to urban area, were found to significantly influence the probability of participation 
in voluntary forest conservation programs for FR land use. The authors pointed out that 
landowners who used a parcel for forest, forest with agricultural, and a combination purposes 
were found to be less likely to participate in conversation programs than landowners who used 
the parcel for residential. 
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Similar to the voluntary programs examples, a number of factors have been identified as 
important regarding ecosystem services conservation efforts. Vignola et al. (2010), in an analysis 
of those factors determining participation in a soil conservation program in the Birris watershed 
in Costa Rica,  surveyed private farmers to determine their general socioeconomic 
characteristics, beliefs associated with soil management, attitude toward risk associated with soil 
management, and attitude to values associated with soil management variables. Based on this 
survey data, the authors used a factor analysis method to determine how various factors influence 
the level of soil conservation among three different farmer groups.22 Results from the analysis 
suggested that there was a negative relationship between risk perception of impacts of 
agricultural activities on erosion and values regarding short-term benefits of erosion with 
conservation effort. The results also suggested that variable with interaction terms were found to 
significantly influence farmers decisions regarding the soil conservation program. The authors 
suggested that an efficient soil conservation program should consider a complex set of factors to 
better promote participation among farmers in the region. The authors also suggested that 
providing technical assistance plays an important role in promoting participating in soil 
conservation practices.  
Based on a random sample of 695 farmers, Greine (2015) surveyed pastoralists in the 
tropical savanna rangelands in Australia during April-July 2013 f. Based on the survey data, the 
author used factor analysis to explain how attitudinal and motivational variables influence 
farmers choices whether to participate in conservation contracts focusing on the agri-
environmental (payment-for-environmental services) schemes (AES) across north Australia. A 
mixed multinomial logit and latent class (LC) models were used to determine factors (contract 
                                                          




attributes, business characteristics, and farmer’s motivations and attitudes) that influence the 
decision process among farmers.23 The mixed multinomial logit model suggested that contract 
attributes were found to significantly influence participation while the LC models showed that 
attitudinal profiles were found to influence farmers intentions of undertaking protection contract. 
The author pointed out that program education was an important factor in promoting landowner 
participation in private conservation and highlighted that motivations and attitudes were 
significant in the decision-making process. 
2.5 Summary 
General factors that influence landowners decisions regarding participation in various 
conservation/restoration programs have been reviewed and identified in this chapter. With an 
increasing understanding of the importance of wetlands, the United States government provides 
rules, regulations, and incentives to guide (and restrict) private landowners regarding 
preservation and conservation of wetlands. Cooperation between government agencies and 
landholders is a critical component of most policy implementation approaches and these policy 
instruments represent key factor in influencing participation decisions among landowners.  
In summary, previous researches provide insight on landowners and other stakeholders 
perceptions and attitudes towards decisions whether to participate in a given conservation 
program and have found that a suite of socio-economic factors are important. The various studies 
described in the above literature review give an overall picture of the factors associated with 
landowners participation. Economic incentives (program payments), education, wildlife habitat, 
                                                          





recreation, and protection had, in general, a positive influence on the participation decisions. 
Institutional programs promoting technical assistance and availability of expert advice should be 
strengthened given their positive effect. 
This chapter discussed the wetland related policy and regulations and focused on 
identifying the factors that affected private landowners decisions to participate various land 
conservation programs. The next chapter will present the basic theoretical framework for 















CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a limited view and discussion of the theoretical methodologies that 
describe individual participation decision process and will be utilized in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
Chapter 2 previously outlined the literature in the area of landowners participation with a 
particular focus on the literature that uses survey data. A number of alternative methodologies 
used in the current literature were discussed and put forward as options for the analyses of the 
landowner survey data. Landowners may have to decide whether they will participate in income-
generating activities on their property and if so, what is the level of participation maximize their 
optimal income derived from these activities over time. The traditional utility theory have been 
developed to analyze landowners behavior. The conceptual model of landowners participation in 
this dissertation rests on a behavioral theory of utility theory. Section 3.2 presents a brief view of 
theoretical framework of utility function used in household’ decision process. Section 3.3 
extends the basic utility theory to the expected utility method and Section 3.4 discuss the net 
present value rules and the choice of discount rate, while the final section of this chapter gives a 
brief summary. 
3.2 The Utility Theory 
The concept of utility is central to theories of decision making. Utility theory is the 
foundation of neoclassical economic demand theory. This theory states that consumption of 
goods or services provides satisfaction, or utility, to consumers. With a limited budget constraint 
(wealth or income), individuals face the problem that how to allocate purchases out of that 




analyze households’ behavior. The basic hypothesis of utility maximization is that a rational 
household will always choose a most preferred bundle from set of feasible alternatives as long as 
certain properties (completeness, transitivity, and non-satiation) are satisfied.  
Consider the problem in this research: the rational landowners know when they choose to 
participate in income-generating activities on their properties and how much expected income 
could be derive from these participation. Landowners seek to make the most of the available 
opportunities given the limited resource they face. According to utility theories (Keeney and 
Raiffa 1976; Von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1982), landowner’s behavior is characterized by a set 
of attributes (e.g., physical characteristics of the property and socioeconomic characteristics of 
the landowner). The landowner assesses his subjective value or utility for each attribute on the 
option to participate in income-generating activities. Finally, the overall evaluation of the option 
is based on a weighted combination of its utilities, and the option producing the greatest 
evaluation is chosen. In microeconomics, the utility maximization problem is the problem 
consumers maximize their utility with limited resource. The traditional utility (U) maximization 
problem faced by the household can be expressed as 
max
𝑥1,⋯,𝑥𝑛
𝑈(𝑥1, 𝑥2, ⋯ , 𝑥𝑛) 
(1) 




where 𝑝𝑖 is the price of the i
th elementary goods, n is the total number of goods, and Y is the 




to maximize his/her utility subject to the budget constraint that says he/she cannot spend more 
than his/her total wealth. Assume an individual chooses a set of inputs, x, to maximize his/her 
utility and there is no set of x’ from the alternative where U(x’) > U(x). Then, the marginal utility 
is given by 𝑀𝑈𝑋 =
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑥𝑖
> 0, which means the additional satisfaction one receives by adding one 
more unit of a good. In general, utility from adding goods follows a pattern of diminishing 
marginal utility. As more and more of a good is added, each new unit gives some utility but less 
than the previous unit. Another important term in utility theory is marginal rate of substitution 
(MRS). The idea of the marginal rate of substitution is that it is a measure of the willingness of 
individuals to trade less of one input for more of the other, keeping their level of satisfaction 
constant. If an individual is adding such that his/her utility is maximized, two conditions must be 
satisfied. He/she must be spending all of his/her budget (otherwise, she could get more utility by 
adding more) and his/her MRS must equal the ratio of prices, Px1/Px2. The price ratio represents 
the opportunity cost of one more unit of X1 in terms of X2. So, in words, this last condition 
means that he/she must be willing to give up X2 to get X1 at the same rate as the opportunity cost 








This theory can be used to explain how a landowner to attain his/her maximum utility 
under limited budget and other constraints. Applying the utility maximization theory to this 
study, landowners maximize their utility (level of income derived from income-generating 
activities) subject to the physical characteristics of the property and socioeconomic 
characteristics of the landowner constraints. And landowners will achieve his/her maximum 




equal to the price ratio). The neoclassical theory predicts that consumer demand will represent 
this optimizing behavior for all goods and services under their limited budget. This model does a 
good job of representing the incentives facing individuals and adjustments individuals make in 
response to changes in prices, income where risk and uncertainty are not usually mentioned 
(Kahneman and Thaler 2006). The maximization problem, however, is presented as static in this 
case. That is, the budget is exhausted entirely with current purchases in order to maximize 
current utility. So there is no sense of forward-looking decisions or savings out of a budget in 
order to provide future utility. Further, this static framework is limiting if individuals want to talk 
about decisions today which generate or affect utility in the future with uncertainty. In reality, 
landowners make their decision to participate in income-generating activities often facing the 
conditions of uncertainty, which have effects on the economic decision. Landowners have to 
account for the uncertainty from the changes of physical and socioeconomic conditions for their 
decision. Therefore, expected utility theory could be more appropriate associated with decision 
making process in income-generating activities. 
3.3 The Expected Utility  
As mentioned, the desired revenue derived from participating in income-generating 
activities is subject to different sources of uncertainty including the changes of physical 
conditions of property, the changes of socioeconomic status of landowners, the changes of policy 
instruments, the changes of market demand, and natural disaster (e.g., hurricane). Suppose a 
landowner consider to participate in income-generating activities on his/her properties 
(comprised by wetland and other type of land) at time t, let  Wt be the total acreage of wetland 




occurrence, h, defined as a random variable.24 The C(Tt; h) is the net cost (include both fixed and 
variable costs) associated with the participation and I(Wt; h) represents the optimum annual 
income (net income) derived from income-generating activities on his/her wetland parcel. 
Based on the expected utility function developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944, 1947, and 1953), the present value of expected utility function can be written as 




where NEU represents the present value of expected utility, r is the discount rate,  and t is the 
year. The 𝑈(∙) is the individual’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and this function 
can be generalized to three distinct groups based on their risk preferences. 𝐸𝑈(∙) exhibits risk 
aversion if and only if 𝑈(x) is a concave function of x (diminishing marginal utility function). 
𝐸𝑈(∙) exhibits risk seeking (or loving) if and only if 𝑈(x) is an increasing function of x 
( increasing marginal utility function). 𝐸𝑈(∙) is risk neutral if and only if 𝑈∗(∙) is a concave 
transformation of 𝑈(∙) ( a linear utility function). Thus, a landowner will chose to participate in 
income-generating activities given that the NEU is positive (i.e., the expected discounted utility 
of the derived income exceeds the discounted utility of the costs). The expected value gives a 
way to measure the relative value of particular choices when considering risk or uncertainty and 
provide useful information to evaluate different choices (Arrow and Lind 2014). 
                                                          
24 Total acreage of wetland used for income-generating activities is the difference between total acreage of land (Tt) 
owned by the landowner and total acres not used (TNt) for income-generating activities (include non-wetland (Nt) 
and wetland not used for income-generating activities (WNt)). The non-wetland acreage is zero in the case of total 




In the cases some uncertainty or risk involved in a participation decision, individuals 
need to adapt this idea to incorporate the probabilistic nature of a range of possible outcomes. As 
it stands, expected utility theory is widely used in theoretical and practical analysis. A number of 
recent studies have been conducted using this approach associated with landowners decision. 
Feder and Onchan (1987) used the expected utility approach associated with the attitude of risk 
averse to estimate the impact of land ownership security on farm investment and land 
improvements. A few years late, Feder et al. (1992) applied the expected utility framework to 
evaluate the importance of factors related to tenure security, farm size, and credit availability in 
determining farmers’ decision on agricultural investment. To investigate factors affecting off-
farm investment of farm households, Mishra and Morehart (2001) used the framework of von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that recognizes risk and assumed the farmer is to 
maximize the expected value of a subject to an income constraint. Based on the expected utility 
theory, Adams (1998) explored the effects of remittances on the accumulation of physical assets 
in one rural area. In the context of wetland restoration and maintenance, landowners face 
substantial levels of uncertainty about how future climatic, economic, and institutional factors 
that will affect the level of income derived from participating income-generating activities and 
payoffs from their investments. Dedah (2010) employed the expected utility framework through 
hypothetical investments distributions with different levels of risk and expected net returns to 
measure the risk preferences of landowners. Isik and Khanna (2003) used a nonlinear mean-
standard deviation expected utility function to determine the impacts of risk aversion and 
uncertainty about weather and soil conditions on the decision to adopt site-specific technologies 
and the levels of cost-share subsidies required to induce adoption. Furthermore, the potential 




empirically explored using the expected utility framework (Koundouri et al. 2006; Kim and 
Chavas 2003; Antle 1983).  
Although the expected utility approach has been widely used and accepted in various 
scenarios, it is not without its flaws. In particular, many experiments have shown that people 
routinely violate the behavioral axioms (Quiggin, 1982; Machina 2009). Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) pointed out that among other things, how preferences of individuals are inconsistent 
among same choices, depending on how those choices are presented in their prospect theory. 
Anand (1995) stated that rationality does not require transitivity, independence or completeness 
and argued that despite the normative and evidential difficulties the general theory of decision-
making based on expected utility is an insightful first order approximation that highlights some 
important fundamental principles of choice, even if it imposes conceptual and technical limits on 
analysis which need to be relaxed in real world settings where knowledge is less certain or 
preferences are more sophisticated. Despite arguments shown that expected utility theory have 
some shortcoming, the expected utility model could be used as the basic model for landowners 
decision to participating in income-generating activities in this study. 
Assume landowners can maximize the expected present value of net income from 
participating in income-generating activities by choosing optimal level of wetland (Wt) used for 
these activities. Thus, maximize equation (2) subject constraints that the total acre of wetland 
used for income-generating activities is the difference between total acreage of wetland owned 
by the landowner and the total acreage of land not used for income-generating activities (i.e., 





𝐻 = 𝐸𝑈[𝐼(𝑊𝑡; ℎ) − 𝐶(𝑇𝑡; ℎ)] + 𝜆(𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝑡)  (3) 
Then, the first-order conditions for maximization are 
𝐻𝑇𝑡






)} + 𝜆 = 0 (4.1) 
𝐻𝑇𝑁𝑡
̇ = 𝐸 {𝑈′(∙)
𝜕𝐶(𝑇𝑡;  ℎ)
𝜕𝑇𝑁𝑡
} − 𝜆 = 0 
(4.2) 
𝐻𝑊𝑡
̇ = 𝐸 {𝑈′(∙)
𝜕𝐼(𝑊𝑡;  ℎ)
𝜕𝑊𝑡
} + 𝜆 = 0 
(4.3) 
𝐻?̇? = 𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝑡 = 0 (4.4) 











Applying the formulas that Cov(X,Y) = E(XY) - E(X)E(Y), E(X+Y) = E(X) + E(Y), and 
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The left-hand side of equation (7) stands for the expected marginal income associated 
with the level of wetland used for income-generating activities. The first term on the right-hand 
side of equation (7) represents the expected marginal cost associated with total land owned by 
the landowner, while the second term on the right-hand side is the expected cost associated with 
the land that not used for income-generating activities. The third term on the right-hand side 
exhibits landowners preference toward risk. The positive and negative of this term represented 
landowners risk preference of risk aversion and risk seeking, respectively. Therefore, risk 
aversion landowners would chose to participate in income-generating activities on their wetland 
parcels if the expected marginal income associated with the level of wetland used for income-
generating activities excessed the marginal cost associated with the total land minus the cost 
associated with the land that not used for income-generating activities and the additional risk cost 
associated with the participation. 
3.4 The Net Present Value Rule 
A traditional decision making rule is the net present value rule (NPV). The NPV 
approach calculates the present value of a series of different future costs and benefits. In the 
NPV function, costs and benefits of a project need to be identified with the same units and 




comparison between or among alternatives. Assume Net present value (NPV) is the value of all 
projected net benefits in today’s dollar terms from an action (participate in income-generating 
activities). The basic ideal of the NPV rule applied to this study is that the landowner should 
participate in income-generating activities if the expected income derived from these activities 
exceeds the cost of participation; and the landowner will not consider to participate in these 
activities if the expected income derived from these activities less than the cost of participation. 
Projected net benefits are simply the sum of benefits minus costs in each time period under a 
















= 𝑃𝑉𝐵 − 𝑃𝑉𝐶 (8) 
where Bt is the sum of benefit in time t, Ct is the sum of cost in time t, r is the discount rate and t 
is the year. PVB and PVC stand for total present value of benefit and total present value of cost, 
respectively. 
The major factors affecting present value are the time and the discount (interest) rate. The 
change in the discount (interest) rate would have a significant effect on net present value 
analysis. In theory, it is not difficult to solve these problems. Comparison can be made between 
the costs and benefits when they are discounted. In equation 8, the PVB and PVC received in 
time t with discount rate r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1.0). A higher discount rate means a greater preference for 
things now rather than later (Hanley and Spash, 1993). The lower discount rate reflects simply a 
less intense preference for the present and does not reflect a preference for the future over the 




costs and benefits over time, it is sometimes difficult to identify a consensus discount rate when 
assessing a project with a long time horizon. If using common discount rates between 4% and 
10%, the costs or benefits in a very long time horizon often have little impact on NPV (Holland 
et al. 2010).  
Following Parks (1993), Zhao and Ziberman (1999), and Dedah (2010) model 
specifications, assume a risk neutral landowner consider to participate in income-generating 
activities on his/her properties (comprised by wetland and other type of land) at time t, let α be 
describe physical characteristics of property and socioeconomic characteristics of landowner that 
influence the level of income derived. The C(Tt; α) is the net cost (include both fixed and 
variable costs) associated with the participation and I(Wt; α) represents the optimum annual 
income (net income) derived from income-generating activities on his/her wetland parcel. 
Assume the net income function I(∙) is increasing and concave (e.g., 𝜕𝐼(∙) 𝜕(𝑊𝑡)⁄ > 0 and 
𝜕2𝐼(∙) 𝜕2(𝑊𝑡)⁄ < 0). The landowners can maximize the present value of net income from 
participating in income-generating activities by choosing optimal level of wetland (Wt) used for 
these activities, to maximize 





subject to  a constraint that describes the flow of wetland acreage used for income-generating 
activities at the end of period 𝑡(𝑊𝑡̇ ), 
 𝑊𝑡̇ =  𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝑡;  




𝐻 = [𝐼(𝑊𝑡;  𝛼) − 𝐶(𝑇𝑡;  𝛼)] + 𝜆(𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝑡)  (10) 



















+ 𝜆 = 0 
(11.3) 
𝐻?̇? = 𝑇𝑡 − 𝑇𝑁𝑡 = 0 (11.4) 










The left-hand side of equation (12) shows that the marginal income associated with the 
level of wetland used for income-generating activities, while the first term on the right-hand side 
of equation (12) represents that the marginal cost associated with total land owned by the 
landowner (first term) minus the cost associated with the land that not used for income-
generating activities (second term). Therefore, landowners could optimize the net income by 
choosing a level of wetland 𝑇𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡
∗ used for income-generating activities under the conditions 
that the marginal income associated with the level of wetland used for income-generating 
activities excessed the marginal cost associated with total land minus the cost associated with the 





This chapter provided a brief review on the theoretical analysis of household decisions. 
The common assumption is that landowners maximize their utility under a set of constraints. 
Based on the theory of utility maximization, landowners make their decision to participate in 
income-generating activities subject to the physical characteristics of the property and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the landowner constraints. Considering risk and uncertainty, 
landowners may have to decide whether they will participate in commercial-based activities on 
the wetland property and how to allocate their resources to achieve the optimal income derived 
from these activities over time. While the basic principle of utility maximization embodied in 
these decision rules underlie all economic models, the specification of net returns will vary with 
different decision context. These theories discussed in this chapter provide an organizing 
framework for understanding these questions: what are the decisions and how it should be made, 
and what are the factors influencing those decisions? The remainder of the dissertation develops 
an empirical context to test the theoretical implication. Next chapter will present the empirical 










CHAPTER 4 ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a discussion of the theoretical considerations with respect 
to household decision behavior. This chapter presents the empirical model to estimate the factors 
that motivate private coastal landowners to participate in and generate income from their coastal 
wetland property. The manner in which wetland owners engage in revenue generating activities 
(i.e., alligator and/or waterfowl hunting activities) is expected to be conditioned on two primary 
factors: the income-generating characteristics of the property (a function of location and 
attributes) and the characteristics of the landowner (including attitudes, opportunity costs, and 
ability to actively manage property). Taken together, these categories would be used to 
determine whether engaging in a given enterprise activity is considered desirable by a specific 
landowner and, if desirable, what is the intensity of participation (i.e., level of income derived) 
One main objective of this study is to examine the factors that motivate private coastal 
landowners to participate in and generate-income from their coastal wetland parcel. Since some 
of the landowners may choose not to participate in these income-generating activities, a portion 
of the dependent variables will equal to zero. Elhorst (1993) pointed out that the estimation of 
models of farm household investment was complicated since most of data include a large number 
of zero values. Including only positive values in dependent variables leads to sample selection 
bias and the simple linear regression ordinary least squares (OLS) produces biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Elhorst 1993; Worku and Mekonnen 2012). Greene (2008) suggested that 





To address the statistical issue associated with the dependent variable having a significant 
number of zero values, the conventional regression models used a binary dependent variable to 
determine these relationship. A number of empirical researchers have looked at factors 
influencing private investments decision using the discrete choice models with probit or logit 
estimators and, assuming a logistic or normal distribution, estimated the probability of a 
household’s decision (Donatos 1995; Mishra and Morehart 2001; Petrick 2004; Romm et al. 
1987; Soule et al. 2000; Koundouri et al. 2006; Norris and Batie, 1987; Featherstone and 
Goodwin, 1993; Hagos and Holden, 2006). Dedah (2010) pointed that the probit/logit 
approaches are useful tools to provide the information on how different characteristics of the 
landowners and their wetland tracts influence the probability of investment in wetland restoration 
and maintenance. These models, however, while evaluating the factors influencing a landowner’s 
decision whether or not to invest fail to provide information about the level of investment in 
wetland restoration and maintenance. Since one of the primary objectives of this research is to 
determine the factors that motivate private coastal landowners to participate in income-
generating activities and the factors that affect the level of income derived from theses actives, 
the Tobit model, also called censored regression model (Tobin 1958), can handle this problem 
and allows for the analysis of the factors affecting the joint decision (Greene 2003). However, 
the Tobit model is very restrictive in its parameterization and there are limitations with respect to 
the use of this model when the proportion of zero values for the dependent variable is significant. 
In the Tobit model, the censored variable (participation) and expected value conditional on the 
level of participation are estimated by the same factors. This model considers only the dependent 
variable to be censored at zero and ignores the source of zero observations (Newman et al, 2003; 




associated with censoring, Heckman (1979) pointed out that estimation on selected subsample 
results in selection bias. He proposes the two-stage estimation procedure (known as Heckit 
model) to deal with the problem associated with the zero observations generated by the non-
participation decision. The Heckit model overcomes the selection bias by using a full sample 
Probit estimation in the first stage, followed by a corrected self-selection estimation carried out 
in the second stage. The model assumes that these two stages are affected by different sets of 
independent variables and there is no zero observations in the second stage.  
Cragg (1971) proposes the double-hurdle model, which generalizes the Tobit model by 
introducing an additional hurdle which must be passed before observing any positive values. 
Similar to Heckit model, the first hurdle refers to the participation decision and the second hurdle 
refers to the level of participation decision. Both models allow the possibility of estimating the 
first and second stage equations using different sets of explanatory variables. The difference is 
that the double-hurdle model permits potential zero values in the second stage. By using a probit 
estimator to model the participation decision, zero observations on the dependent variable can be 
either attributed to corner solutions or nonparticipation. The double-hurdle model also allows the 
decision participating in income-generating activities and the level of income to be treated 
separately. Therefore, a separate stochastic process can be used to model the probability of 
participation and the level of participation (Carroll et al. 2005). 
As mentioned, the first stage of the double-hurdle model, or the first hurdle, in the current 
analysis represents the decision by a wetland owner whether or not to participate in income-
generating activities, while the second stage represents the desired level of income. According to 
the assumption of the Heckit model, all the observed observations are positive in the second 




positive level of income. In this research, therefore, a double-hurdle model is presented as an 
empirical framework to examine the effects of various factors on both participation in and 
intensity of participation.  
Section 4.2 briefly introduces the underlying theory of the Tobit model. The Heckit 
model is discussed in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 outlines the empirical models used in the 
study. Section 4.5 discusses model specification, while the last section presents the summary and 
conclusion. 
4.2 The Standard Tobit Model  
The standard Tobit model is defined as 
𝑡𝑖











∗ is a latent unobserved endogenous variable which represents landowner i’s desired 
level of income for participating in income-generating activities, 𝑡𝑖 is the corresponding observed 
variable which measures actual level of income for a landowner i. 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of potential 
explanatory variables that influence the landowner’s decisions to participate in income-
generating activities, and 𝛽 is a vector of the associated parameters to be estimated. In this 
model, 𝑣𝑖 is assumed to be a homoskedastic and normally distributed error term. The equation 
(13.2) implies that the observed desired level of income are positive continuous value if the 





∗ ≤ 0. Note that since there are no negative values for income, the dependent variable 𝑡𝑖 
could be censored at zero without any loss of generality. Therefore, the observed zero on the 
dependent variable can be either “true” zero (i.e. due to landowner’s deliberate choice) or 
censored zero (i.e. caused by data collection methods). Essentially the Tobit model suggests that 
the latent variable 𝑡𝑖
∗ represents desired levels of income which for some landowners is 
unobservable. These unobserved desired levels of income are transformed to a single value 
representing zero level of observed income. The Tobit model therefore assumes that there are 
landowners with zero levels of income who would like to participate in income-generating 
activities (i.e. have a desired level of income). Compared to an OLS regression, the main 
advantage of the Tobit model is using both zero and positive observations.  As such, it yields 
estimates that are unbiased as well as consistent. 
Using maximum likelihood method, the likelihood function of standard Tobit is given by 
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ ln [1 − Φ (
𝑥𝑖𝛽
𝜎









where “0” under the summation sign denotes the summation over the zero observations in the 
sample (level of income 𝑡𝑖 is zero) and “+” indicates summation over the positive observations 
(level of income 𝑡𝑖 is positive); Φ(∙) and ∅(∙) denotes standard normal cumulative distribution 
function and standard normal probability density function (cdf and pdf), respectively. 
4.3 The Generalized Tobit Model (Heckit Model)  
As mentioned, to correct the sample selection bias, which arises when interest centers on 




observed positive values of the dependent variable, Heckman (1979) proposes the two-stage 
estimation method. The first stage estimates the participation decision and the second stage 
estimates for level of participation. According to Heckman (1979) and Flood and Gråsjö (1998), 
the standard Tobit model can be modified as 
Stage 1: Participation decision 
𝑑𝑖








Stage 2: Level of participation decision: 
𝑡𝑖





∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖 = 1
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖 = 0
 (15.4) 
In this specification, separate sets of factors are assumed to influence the decisions to 
participate in income-generating activities and the actual level of income from these activities. 
𝑥1𝑖 and 𝑥2𝑖 are vectors of explanatory variables in the two stages of the decision, respectively. 
Hence, the model assumes that the decisions of participation and level of participation are 
affected by separated sets of factors. These variables are also assumed to be uncorrelated with 
their respective error terms (𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖). As in Tobit model, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are corresponding vectors 
of parameters. 𝑑𝑖
∗ is a latent variable that denotes binary censoring, 𝑑𝑖 is the observed value 




participation in income-generating activities on his property; otherwise it takes the value zero). 
Hence, the actual level of income 𝑡𝑖 equals the unobserved latent value 𝑡𝑖
∗ only when a positive 
participation decision is reported; otherwise, it takes the value zero. In this case, the error terms 
𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 are assumed to be normally and independently distributed, which implies that there is 
no relationship between the two stages of decision.  
Heckman (1979), however, assumes that the two error terms are correlated and the first 












where 𝜌 represents the correlation coefficient of the error terms. The domination assumption 
means the participation is a deliberate choice. Then the model is estimated by Probit for the 
decision on participation and standard OLS for the positive participation decisions. The log-
likelihood function for the case that the error terms are correlated is given by 
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ ln [1 − Φ (
𝑥1𝑖𝛽1
𝜎















If the error terms are independent (i.e. ρ=0), then the log-likelihood function is simplified as: 
𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ ln [1 − Φ (
𝑥1𝑖𝛽1
𝜎












4.4 The Double-Hurdle Model  
Cragg (1971) first proposed the double-hurdle model as a generalization of the Tobit 
model in the context of analysis of household durable expenditures by allowing the possibility 
that a factor might have different effects on the probability of acquisition and the magnitude of 
acquisition. It hypothesizes that individuals must pass two separate hurdles before they are 
observed with a positive level of consumption.  
In this research, the decision process of private landowners can be divided into a two-
stage decision making process. In the first stage, the wetland owner must decide whether to 
participate in income-generating activities (participation decision). Conditional on the outcome 
of the first stage, the second stage considers the desired level of income to be forthcoming from 
these activities (subject to the characteristics of the property). As noted by Detre et al. (2010), 
observing a positive level of income requires that two distinct hurdles be passed with the use of a 
latent variable in the first stage allowing for the modeling of the complete decision-making 
process. The decision as to whether to participate (stage 1) is expected to reflect the individual’s 
perceptions and attitudes toward those factors influencing income-generating activities and is at 
least partially based on beliefs by the wetland owner as to whether participation in such activities 
would yield a positive return on investment. These beliefs are not directly observed. Instead, a 
binary variable denoting whether these beliefs will be positive or negative could be observable 
from a survey question asking whether the individual would undertake income-generating 
activities under any circumstances. A yes (no) response would indicate whether the individual is 




Given a positive outcome in the first phase, the landowner decides in the second phase 
the desired level of income generating activities subject to the physical characteristics of the 
property. The desired level of income subject to the physical characteristics of the property 
(stage 2) may differ from that associated with profit maximization, with the differential 
depending (in part) upon the socioeconomic characteristics of the wetland owner. 
The decision process above suggests a double-hurdle model with sample selection (Saha 
et al. 1994; Shonkwiler and Shaw 1996; Woldehanna et al. 2000; Dhakal et al. 2008; Detre et al. 
2010) that is adapted within a Tobit estimator because survey results will likely show that many 
landowners generate no revenues from their coastal properties for either or both of the enterprise 
activities considered in this study. 25 The double-hurdle extends the standard Tobit and Heckit 
models to overcome the zero income. The general equations of the double-hurdle model is 
similar as the Heckit model, but there is a slight modification in the equation.  Following Jones 
(1989), the specification of the double-hurdle model can be expressed as following 
Stage 1: Participation decision 
𝑑𝑖








Stage 2: Desired level of income 
                                                          
25 This statement is supported by Roberts et al. (1999) in their analysis of income derived from surface-use activities 










∗ 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖 = 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑖
∗ > 0
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖 = 0
 (19.4) 
Finally, the observed level of income is determined as 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 ∙ 𝑡𝑖 (19.5) 
In this specification, a positive level of income 𝑦𝑖 is observed if 𝑑𝑖
∗ > 0 and 𝑡𝑖
∗ > 0. This 
illustrates the double-hurdle element to the model. 𝑑𝑖
∗ is a latent endogenous variable 
representing the decision to participate in income-generating activities for landowner i, 𝑡𝑖
∗ is a 
latent variable representing the level of income for landowner i, 𝑦𝑖 is the observed level of 
income for a landowner i. 𝑥1𝑖 is a set of landowner characteristics and beliefs that influence the 
landowner’s decision to participate in income-generating activities, 𝑥2𝑖 is a vector of physical 
characteristics of the property (e.g., total acres and percent in different wetland types and open 
water) that affect the landowner’s level of income. 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are vectors of estimable parameter. 
In this formulation, (𝑥1𝑖 ; 𝑥2𝑖 ) may contain the same common explanatory variables, although 
their corresponding effects on the two hurdle equations might be quite different. 𝑢𝑖 is normalized 
to 1 since the outcome of the first hurdle is binary. Both error terms, 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖, are assumed to be 











As in the Tobit and Heckit model cases, the independent double-hurdle model is 




𝑙𝑛𝐿 = ∑ ln [1 − Φ(𝑥1𝑖𝛽1)Φ (
𝑥2𝑖𝛽2
𝜎









The first term on the right-hand side denotes the summation over the zero observations in 
the sample. It indicates that the zero observations are affected by both participation and level of 
participation decisions. This is in contrast with Heckit model which assumes that all zero 




), contributes the effect of possible zero values in the second stage decision in the 
double-hurdle model. The first term captures the possibility of observing zero values in the 
second stage decision and thus indicating the second stage is represented like a Tobit model.  
The second term on the right-hand side indicates summation over the positive observations; this 
term expresses the conditional probability distribution and density function coming from 
censoring rule and observed positive values (Fabiosa, 2006). In this research, the former denotes 
the probability of passing the participation hurdle, and the latter indicates the density of 
observing non-zero income from participating in income-generating activities. Estimation of the 
above model will empirically determine the importance of economic versus other criteria related 
to the income generating potential of coastal wetland properties. It is worthwhile noting that the 
second stage of the two-step process represents a modified hedonic model. Thus, based on the 
empirical results forthcoming from the model estimation, one can determine the implicit price of 
different property characteristics as they relate to income derived from the two enterprise 
activities as well as the implicit prices of human capital (e.g. presence of a lodge or blinds). 
Furthermore, under the assumption of independent, homoscedastic, and normally 




summation log-likelihood of Probit model and truncated regression model (McDowell, 2003; 
Aristei et al. 2008). The log-likelihood function can be maximized by maximizing the two 
components separately (Jones, 1989; McDowell, 2003). The parameter estimates of the double-
hurdle model, however, provide little direct information besides indicating the significance of the 
explanatory variable and the direction of its influence on the dependent variable. The economic 
interpretation frequently focuses on the analysis of the marginal effects of repressors on the 
expected value of 𝑦𝑖 for limited dependent variable models (Jones and Yen, 2000). Thus, to fully 
understand the magnitude of the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables, 
the marginal effects using the maximum likelihood results obtained from the estimated model 
need to be explored. Based on different definitions of the expected value of the dependent 
variable 𝑦𝑖, three different marginal effects can be calculated. The unconditional expected mean 
(overall effect on the dependent variable) is the one of most interest in this model. This term is 
written as 𝐸(𝑦𝑖 𝑥2𝑖⁄ ) and can be decomposed into two parts. By using the McDonald and Moffitt 
(1980) decomposition, the unconditional expected value of the double-hurdle model can be 
expressed as (Yen and Jensen, 1996) 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑦𝑖 > 0) ∗ 𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖 > 0) (22) 
where 𝑃(𝑦𝑖 > 0) is the probability of income and 𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖 > 0) is the conditional expected level 
of income. Following Burke’s (2009) notation, the probability of participation is given by 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 > 0 𝑥1𝑖⁄ ) = 1 − 𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 0 𝑥1𝑖⁄ ) = Φ(𝑥1𝑖𝛽1) (23) 








where λ(.) is the inverse Mills ratio 𝜆(∙) =
∅(∙)
Φ(∙)
. After substituting equations (23) and (24) into 
equation (22), the unconditional expected value of y can be expressed as follows 




Taking the first derivative of equations (23), (24), and (25) with respect to the 
explanatory variable 𝑥𝑗 yields the double-hurdle marginal effects of the explanatory variable 𝑥𝑗 
on the probability of income, the conditional level of income, and unconditional level of income. 
So, the marginal effect of the explanatory variable 𝑥𝑗 on the probability of income is expressed 
as 
𝜕𝑃(𝑦𝑖 > 0 𝑥1⁄ )
𝜕𝑥𝑗
= 𝛽1𝑗∅(𝑥1𝛽1) (26) 
where 𝛽1𝑗 is the element of 𝛽1 representing the coefficient on 𝑥𝑗. The conditional marginal effect 
of the explanatory variable xj given that landowners have made a positive level of income is 
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖 𝑥2𝑖 ,⁄ 𝑦𝑖 > 0)
𝜕𝑥𝑗










where 𝛽2𝑗 is the element of 𝛽2 representing the coefficient on 𝑥𝑗. If  𝑥𝑗  𝜖 𝑥1, 𝑥2, the unconditional 





















If  𝑥𝑗 is only determining the probability of y > 0, then 𝛽2𝑗 = 0, and the unconditional 
marginal effect of the explanatory variable xj is  
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖 𝑥1,⁄ 𝑥2)
𝜕𝑥𝑗




On the other hand, if  𝑥𝑗 is only determining the value of y with y > 0, then 𝛽1𝑗 = 0, and 
the unconditional marginal effect of the explanatory variable xj is  
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖 𝑥1,⁄ 𝑥2)
𝜕𝑥𝑗










From these marginal effects, elasticities for the probability of a positive income, the 
conditional level of income, and the unconditional level of income can be derived. In particular, 

















where the first term on the right-hand side denotes the elasticity of the probability of observing a 
positive income (𝑒𝑗
𝑝
) and the second term on the right-hand side denotes the elasticity of 
conditional income (𝑒𝑗
𝑐). The elasticities are calculated at the sample means for continuous 
variable. For categorical explanatory variables, 𝑒𝑗
𝑝
, 𝑒𝑗




in probability of a positive value, conditional level and unconditional level when the value of the 
variable shifts from zero to one, holding all the other variables constant (Yen and Jones, 1997; 
Newman et al. 2003). 
4.5 Specification Issues  
4.5.1 Heteroskedasticity  
The consistency of maximum likelihood estimates for the double-hurdle model are based 
on the assumptions of homoscedasticity and the normality of 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖. The homoscedastic 
assumption, however, is likely to be violated for these cross-sectional survey data in this 
research. The presence of heteroscedasticity in limited dependent variable model would lead to 
inconsistent parameter estimates (Maddala and Nelson 1975; Arabmazer and Schmidt, 1981; Lin 
and Schmidt, 1984). To overcome this problem, the standard deviation of the error term is 
allowed to vary across observations by specifying it as a function of a set of exogenous variables 
(Newman et al. 2003 and Aristei and Pieroni, 2008) and defined as 
𝜎𝑖 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑧𝑖ℎ) (32) 
where zi represents the continuous variables in 𝑥𝑖   (𝑧𝑖 𝜖 𝑥𝑖) and h is a conformable vector of 
coefficients. The exponential specification is chosen as it imposes the desirable income that the 
standard deviation 𝜎𝑖 be strictly positive (Su and Yen, 1996; Yen, 1993; Yen and Jensen, 1996; 
Newman et al. 2003). A likelihood ratio test (LR) can be used to test the restrictions (H0: h =0) 





4.5.2 Non-Normal Error Structure 
The double-hurdle model relies on the assumption of normality of errors, 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖. 
Similar to the case of heteroscedasticity, the maximum likelihood estimates will be inconsistent 
if the normality assumption is not tenable (Arabmazer and Schmidt, 1982). One way to 
accommodate the assumption of normality is by transforming the dependent and latent variables. 
The dependent variable was manipulated using a Box-Cox transformation (Jones and Yen, 2000 




          0 < 𝜆 < 1 (33) 
Note that linear and logarithmic transformation are two special cases in the Box-Cox 
transformation above when λ = 1 and λ → 0, respectively. In general, λ would be expected to lie 
between these extremes (Moffatt, 2005). 
The log-likelihood function for the independent Box-Cox double-hurdle model after 
applying the Box-Cox transformation can be written as (Moffatt, 2005): 

















This expression is similar to equation (21) but the use of YT instead of ti in the final term 





In this chapter, three main econometric methodologies that could be utilized to 
investigate landowners’ decisions concerning participation in income-generating activities have 
been reviewed. While the review is intended to be comprehensive of empirical economic models, 
it is not comprehensive of empirical household decision models in general. As was seen in 
Chapter 2, these models have already been used in the literature to analyze factors affecting 
landowner’s participation in wetland restoration programs and different conservation programs.  
These models describe a common situation where the dependent variable is zero for a 
portion of the population but positive for the remainder of the population. As pointed out in this 
chapter, the most commonly applied technique in this case is using the Tobit model, which 
assumes that zero observation occur because of a corner solution. This assumption, however, 
underlying the Tobit model, may not be applicable in certain situations. Two generalizations to 
the Tobit model, Heckman model and Cragg’s double-hurdle model, in particular were outlined 
in this chapter. The key similarity between Heckman and double-hurdle model is that there are 
two separate decision stages.  
As discussed, the underlying assumption that whether there is first hurdle dominance or 
not and whether the choice to participate and the level of income are joint or sequential 
decisions. The Heckman model assumes that all zero observations are only from participation 
decision. Compare to the Heckman model, the double-hurdle allows the zero observations are 
affected by both participation and level of participation decisions. The purpose of this study is to 
identify the factors that determine both the probability of participating in income-generating 




process. Given the relative merits of each model and previous empirical research, the double-
hurdle model appears to most adequately explain landowner’s participation decision and level of 
participation in income-generating activities from their wetland property. The next chapter 

















CHAPTER 5 SURVEY AND DESCRIPTION STATISTICS 
5.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters discussed the empirical methodologies that could be used to examine 
the research problem introduced in Chapter 1. This chapter outlines and describes the data set 
that will be used. A landowner’s decision to employ coastal wetlands in income-generating 
activities involves a number of factors, including expected net returns from engaging in these 
activities, uncertainty as to the outcome of engagement, and an array of socioeconomic 
characteristics of the wetland owner (which may also influence his perception of uncertainty). 
Under simplified economic theoretical conditions, a landowner will enroll his property in 
income-generating activities as long as the net present value of the expected cash flow from 
these activities is positive and will utilize the property in such a manner as to maximize profits. 
A growing body of evidence, however, suggests that this simplified theoretical model does not 
match actual practices in agriculture and forestry, with factors such as risk and conservation 
perceptions needing to be considered in order to adequately explain not only participation in an 
economic enterprise, but also the intensity of participation. 
Since the focus of this study is to determine landowner’s decisions concerning 
participation in income-generating activities and the level of participation from their coastal 
properties, a detailed analysis requires the use of landowner survey data. In this research, the 
survey was implemented using Dillman’s (2011) tailored design method for mail survey. This 
survey collected information about a landowner’s decision to participate in income-generating 
activities and income derived from this participation. It also provides the physical characteristics 




this survey is the primary source of data for this study and this chapter will outline the survey in 
greater detail. There are two main goals for this chapter. The first is to describe the survey design 
and response and the methodology supporting the collection of data in the questionnaire. This is 
presented in Section 5.2. The second main objective is to present a descriptive statistics analysis 
of response in order to provide a basis for the econometric analysis presented in Chapters 6. This 
descriptive analysis is presented in Section 5.3 while Section 5.4 provides a summary of the 
survey data. 
5.2 Survey Design and Response 
5.2.1 Survey Design and Implementation 
Champ (2003) pointed out that a mail survey avoids interviewer effects and allows 
respondents to complete the survey according to their schedule, and this method is less expensive 
than in-person or telephone survey.  The questionnaire was developed based on the tailored 
design method for mail surveys, which consisted of a booklet questionnaire, a postcard reminder, 
and a replacement questionnaire (Dillman 2011). This survey was designed to determine the 
physical property characteristics and landowner characteristics that influence the participation 
decision (whether the landowner participates in income-generating activities on a specific 
property parcel) and the intensity of participation (e.g., revenues generated from the parcel). 
After a thorough literature review, several iterations of draft questionnaire were developed over 
several months in early 2015 after which time the questionnaire was sent to several of the Sea 
Grant extension agents for their review and comments. After making the changes suggested by 




Review Board Office for approval (IRB NO. E9722 Expires: 01/17/2019).26 The final survey 
instrument contained two sections with a total of 23 questions that allowed for quick answers 
selected from several categories. The last question was more open-ended, which solicited 
respondent’s suggestions and comments on any topics that might not have been adequately 
covered in this survey. The final version of the questionnaire is given in Appendix B. 
The mailing list of private coastal landowners was obtained from coastal zone parish 
assessor’s offices.27 As shown in Figure 1, landowners in these costal parishes might participate 
in income-generating activities on their wetland parcels. According to 2014 Louisiana Summary 
(Westra 2014), total Louisiana gross farm value of all wild alligator harvest and waterfowl 
hunting leases during 2014 were $10.8 million and $33.6 million in, respectively. Total gross 
farm value of all wild alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting from the 20 coastal parishes 
during 2014 were $9.7 million and $18.4 million which, respectively, account for 89 percent and 
55 percent of the state total for these two enterprises. 
Due to data and budgetary limitations, only five coastal parishes (Cameron, Lafourche, 
Plaquemines, Terrebonne, and Vermilion parishes) were chosen in this study (Figure 5.2).28 
Based on records from these five parishes assessor’s offices, a data set on a total of 1,159 
wetland parcels include all information on parcel number, primary owner, mailing address, ward,  
                                                          
26 See Appendix A. 
27 The state of Louisiana is divided into 64 parishes, of which 20 parishes are located in Louisiana’s coastal zone 
(LDNR 2010). The Louisiana Coastal Zone parishes includes: Ascension, Assumption, Calcasieu, Cameron, Iberia, 
Jefferson, Lafourche, Livingston, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the Baptist, St. 
Martin, St. Mary, St. Tammany, Terrebonne, Tangipahoa, and Vermilion. This study is interested in the coastal zone 
parishes in Louisiana and focus on Cameron, Lafourche, Plaquemines, Terrebonne, and Vermilion five parishes. 
28 Total gross farm value of all wild alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting from these five coastal parishes during 
2014 were $6.5 million and $17.2 million, which account for 60 percent and 51 percent of the state total and account 





Figure 5.1 Coastal Parishes in Louisiana 
 
 




taxable property type, legal description, physical address, parcel items, deeds, and ownership 
history.29 From this raw data, a total of 297 wetland parcels was drawn from Cameron parish, a 
total of 226 wetland parcels was drawn from Vermilion parish, a total of 257 wetland parcels 
was drawn from Terrebonne, a total of 172 wetland parcels was drawn from Lafourche parish, 
and a total of 207 wetland parcels was drawn from Plaquemines parish.  
Following Dedah (2010), this study stratified landowners into three groups based on the 
number of wetland parcels they owned using the 1,159 wetland parcels as the sample frame. The 
first group included all landowners with only one wetland parcel. The second group included all 
landowners with two wetland parcels, and the third group included all landowners with more 
than two parcels (this latter group largely consisting of large corporations). The questionnaire 
was not sent to the third group since landowners who own various wetland parcels might make 
diverse participation decisions for different activities on different parcels, but the designed 
questions for this research is attempt to have landowners pay more attention on alligator harvest 
and/or waterfowl hunting activities from a specific wetland parcel. Furthermore, landowners 
with three or more parcels may know little about the activities on individual parcels and may 
often represent large corporations. 
After eliminating duplicate parcels, parcels without mailing addresses, landowners listed 
with three or more parcels, and publicly owned properties, the sample was reduced to a total of 
941 landowners and this represents the population to which the questionnaire was distributed.30 
Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of the survey address across the five coastal parishes in 
                                                          
29 A ward, by definition, is a subdivision of a local authority area, typically used for electoral purposes. Wards are 
usually named after neighborhoods, thoroughfares, parishes, landmarks, geographical features and in some cases 
historical figures connected to the area. 
30 Survey were sent to 166 landowners in Cameron, 209 landowners in Vermilion, 221 landowners in Terrebonne, 




Louisiana. Property owners in the sample were surveyed to determine their attitudes toward the 
use of individual parcels for income-generating activities, attitudes towards cost-share programs, 
the actual use of their wetland holdings in terms of the percentage of the parcel being actively 
used in income generating activities, surface-based revenues generated from these parcels 
(disaggregated by the categories), and their general socioeconomic profile. While research 
examining the attributes that lead to income-generating activities from coastal wetland properties 
has not been conducted, research in the related agriculture and forestry fields is extensive. Based 
upon a review of this research, information associated with the physical characteristics of the 
property and socioeconomic characteristics of the landowner were collected for analysis in the 
current study. In total, the survey was mailed to a sample size of 941 private landowners. Each 
questionnaire sent to landowners with parcels in Cameron, Lafourche, and Terrebonne parishes 
included a parcel geographic information system (GIS) map. This GIS parcel map contained 
information on, parcel boundary, parcel number, listed acres, wetland types, and parcel location 
from google image (see Figure 5.4 for an example of one of these maps). Two separate GIS 
 










parcel maps were sent to those landowners with two wetland parcels. These GIS maps, however, 
were not available for the other two parishes in the study. As such, included in each survey sent 
to landowners with parcels in Vermilion and Plaquemines parishes was the parcel assessment 
listing. This parcel assessment listing included information on primary owner, mailing address, 
ward, legal description, and property class. (See Figure 5.5 for an example of one of these 
assessment listing). Two assessment listings were provided to landowners in these two parishes 
who were listed as owners of two wetland parcels. 
 





The process of surveying respondents followed a modified Tailored Design Method 
(Dillman 2011). Of the original 941 survey questionnaires, an initial wave of survey packages, 
including a cover letter, questionnaire, a GIS parcel map, and a self-addressed postage-paid 
envelope, was sent to 525 landowners who own the wetland property in Cameron, Lafourche, 
and Terrebonne parishes in January, 2016. Approximately two weeks later a reminder post-card 
encouraging landowners to fill out the survey was sent out.  Following the same structure, a 
second wave of survey was sent to 416 landowners who own the wetland property in Plaquemine 
and Vermilion parishes in April, 2016. 
5.2.2 Survey Responses 
Removing the undelivered questionnaires (a total of 75) resulted in a final sample size of 
866 wetland parcels. Of the 866 questionnaires that were initially mailed out, 153 were returned 
fully or partially completed by the respondent (including those, which were returned with no 
information when the respondents indicated that the ownership of property had changed). The 
final response rate was therefore 17.7% (Table 5.1). 
The number of responses, by parishes, is shown in Figure 5.6. The parish with the highest 
number of responses for this survey was Terrebonne parish (47 respondents), followed by 
Vermilion parish (34 respondents), Cameron parish (26 respondents), Lafourche parish (24 
respondents), and then Plaquemines parish (22 respondents). The respondents owned a total of  
Table 5.1 Survey Responses 
Surveys First mail-wave Second mail-wave Total mail 
Delivered 482 384 866 
Returned 97 55 153 






Figure 5.6 Number of Responses from Each Study Parish 
 
99,425 acres. In terms of the total wetland acreage controlled by the survey respondents, these 
landowners owned approximately 2.9% of the total wetland acreage in Louisiana’s coastal zone 
(3.4 million acres). However, much of the wetland acreage throughout the coastal zone is owned 
by major corporations and these corporations were purposely excluded from the survey. 
5.3 Descriptive Analysis 
5.3.1 Characteristics of the Landowner 
Table 5.2 presents a summary of the demographic data obtained from the survey. The 
majority of landowners were more than 65 years old (62%), followed by these landowners who 
were 55 to 64 years of old (25%). About 11% of respondents were 45 to 54 years old. Most 









Table 5.2 General Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics of Landowner 
Description Percent (%) Cumulative percent (%) 
Age   
    Under 25 0 0 
    25 - 34 0 0 
    34 – 44 2.07 2.07 
    45 - 54 11.03 13.10 
    55 - 64 24.83 37.93 
    65 or older 62.07 100.00 
Gender   
    Female 31.03 31.03 
    Male 68.97 100.00 
Race   
    White 96.55 96.55 
    Asian 0.00 96.55 
    Native American 0.69 97.24 
    Black/African American 0.00 97.24 
    Latino/Hispanic 0.69 97.93 
    Other 2.07 100.00 
Total household income   
    Under $20,000 4.39 4.39 
    $20,000 - $39,999 7.02 11.40 
    $40,000 - $59,999 13.16 24.56 
    $60,000 - $79,999 9.65 34.21 
    $80,000 - $99,999 13.16 47.37 
    $100,000 - $150,000 18.42 65.79 
    $Over $150,000 34.21 100.00 
Education attainment   
    Less than high school 3.55 3.55 
    High school degree or equivalent 14.18 17.73 
    Some college 21.28 39.01 
    College degree 33.34 72.34 
    Master degree 7.09 79.43 
    Doctorate 20.57 100.00 
Outdoor enthusiast   
    Not an outdoor enthusiast 32.41 32.41 
    An outdoor enthusiast 67.59 100.00 
Environmentalist   
    Not an environmentalist 27.27 27.27 




As reported in Table 5.2, less than 35% of respondents reported that they had annual 
household income of $79,999 or less while 13% of the respondents had annual household 
income in the range of $80,000 to $99,999. In addition, about 18% of respondents had annual 
household incomes ranging from $100,000 to $150,000 while 34% of the respondents reported 
annual household income over $150,000. With respect to education, a third of the survey 
respondents reported having a college degree while 20% of the total respondents reported a 
doctorate degree. Less than 18% of the total respondents reported a high school degree or less. 
About 68% of respondents answered they are an outdoor enthusiast and 73% of respondents 
considered themselves to be an environmentalist.  
5.3.2 Characteristics of the Property 
The respondents indicated that, on average, the relevant property was comprised of  734 
acres of freshwater marsh, 510 acres of brackish marsh, 62 acres of salt marsh, and 341 acres of 
other land (including open water), respectively (Table 5.3). Overall, survey respondents 
indicated that the property had been in family possession for an average of 70 years with a range 
from 3 to 150 years (Table 5.3).  
Among parcels jointly owned, ownership averaged 27% with a range from 0.3 to 90% 
(Table 5.3). The most common ownership structure among respondents was joint ownership 
through an undivided heirship (36%) followed by sole ownership (30%) and joint ownership 
through a corporation or trust (22%). The remaining 12% of the parcels were owned through 
some other ownership structures, such as divided interest and joint through a limited liability 
company (Table 5.3). As shown in Figure 5.7, the most common land type reported by 
respondents was brackish marsh with approximately a third indicating that their parcel contained 




Table 5.3 Statistical Descriptive of Land Characteristics and Ownership Structure 
Description Mean Min Max 
Total acreage of freshwater marsh 734 0 6620 
Total acreage of brackish marsh 510 0 7370 
Total acreage of salt marsh 62 0 1040 
Total acreage of other type land 341 0 6570 
Years of ownership (year) 70 3 150 
Percentage of ownership (%) 27 0.3 90 
 




    Sole ownership 30.14 30.14 
    Joint ownership through an undivided heirship 35.62 65.75 
    Joint ownership through a corporation or trust 21.92 87.67 
    Other ownership 12.33 100.00 
 
 





respondents), followed by salt marsh (about 18% of the respondents). Only 3% of the 
respondents reported that the parcel subject to study included other land type (non-wetland). 
About 10% and 9% of respondent indicated that their property had both salt and brackish marsh 
or had both brackish and freshwater marsh, respectively. In addition, 3% of respondents reported 
that their land included all three type of wetland (salt, brackish, and freshwater marsh). 
In addition to land ownership and type of wetland, the survey sought to determine the use 
of the property for commercial-based activities. About 41% of the respondents reported that they 
used their land for some commercial-based activities (Figure 5.8). Following this question, 
landowners who reported commercial-based activities were asked to indicate the type of 
commercial activity (activities) on their property. About 66% of respondents reported that their 
parcel was used for alligator harvest and/or waterfowl hunting activities (Figure 5.9). Primary 
commercial-based activities were combined into three categories: (1) alligator harvest (including 
egg collection); (2) waterfowl hunting; and (3) other commercial activities. As shown in 
Figure5.9, the most common practice was both alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting activities,  
  





Figure 5.9 Landowner’s Responses about Different Type of Commercial-Based Activities 
with approximately 26% of the respondents using their land for these two income-generating 
activities. Almost a quarter reported that their parcel was used for other commercial activities 
(23%).31 . Approximately 20% of the respondents reported that their parcels were used for 
alligator harvest activity only, while 7% of the respondents reported that their parcels were used 
for waterfowl hunting activity only. In addition, about 16% of the respondents indicated that they 
used the land for alligator harvest, waterfowl hunting, and other commercial activity. The 
average income derived from alligator harvest activity among landowners who reported that their 
parcels were used only for this activity was $7,030 with a range from $200 to $45,000 (Table 
5.4). The average income derived from waterfowl hunting activity (leasing) among landowners 
who reported that their parcels were used for only for this purpose was $6,045 with a range from 
$500 to $44,000. Average income generated from either or both of these activities were $12,204 
                                                          
31 According to responding landowners, other commercial-based activities include farming, shrimping, crabbing, 
grazing, pasture, cattle production, and commercial/industrial land rental for the non-wetland portion of the parcel. 





Table 5.4 Reported Income Derived from Commercial-Based Activities 
Description Mean Min Max 
Income derived from alligator harvest activity ($) 7,030 200 45,000 
Income derived from waterfowl hunting activity ($)  6,045 500 44,000 
Income derived from alligator harvest and/or 
waterfowl hunting activities ($) 
12,204 500 45,000 
Income derived from other commercial activities 
($) 
27,442 0 162,863 
with a range from $500 to $45,000. In addition, the average income derived from other 
commercial activities was $27,442 with a range of $0 to $162,863. As shown in Figure 5.10, 
among respondents who used their parcel for income generating activities (alligator harvest 
and/or waterfowl hunting), about 74% indicated that there was no hunting lodge/camp on the 
parcel while about two-thirds indicated that they did not actively manage their property for 
 
Figure 5.10 Landowners Responses to Active Management the Wetland Parcel for Waterfowl 





waterfowl habitat. Finally, 37% of respondents reported that they received sub-surface (oil & 
gas) revenue from the parcel of interest (Figure 5.11). 
 
Figure 5.11 Landowners Response to Receive Sub-Surface (Oil & Gas) Revenue 
 
5.3.3 Landowner’s Attitude toward Wetland Restoration Program and Policy Instruments 
Landowners were asked if they participate in any state or federal wetland restoration 
program on the property specified in the questionnaire. About 10% of respondents indicated that 
they participated in some state or federal wetland restoration programs (Table 5.5). 
Approximately 34% of these respondents reported that they participated in Wetlands Reserve 
Program or Coastal Wetlands Planning, Preservation & Restoration Act (CWPPRA). About 20% 
of the respondents reported that they participated in both Coastal Protection and Restoration 
Authority (CPRA) and CWPPRA programs. About 13% of these landowners reported that they 
Table 5.5 Landowner Participated in State or Federal Wetland Restoration Program 
 Percent (%) Cumulative percent (%) 
Yes 9.59 9.59 




participated in CPRA program, while a third of respondents enrolled in other wetland restoration 
programs (e.g., Migratory Bird Habitat Initiative). The majority of respondents (90%) did not 
enroll in any wetland restoration programs (Table 5.5). Those landowners who did not 
participate in any state or federal wetland restoration programs were asked why they did not opt 
to enroll restoration programs and how much importance they placed on these different reasons: 
(1) too complicated to apply; (2) don’t want long-term contract; (3) not enough financial 
incentive; (4) need the land for other purposes; and (5) ‘other’ reasons (see Appendix B: Q14b). 
They were asked to rate (on a 3-point Likert scale) the importance of each of the reasons (Figure 
5.12). The majority of landowners reported that ‘other’ reasons were the most important factors 
for the decision to participate in state or federal wetland restoration programs. Respondents 
reported that ‘other’ reasons included: (1) don’t know anything about the restoration program; 
(2) applied but be rejected; (3) have no interest on this matter; (4) living in another state; (5) too 
many heirs; and (6) never thought about it. About 96% respondents indicated that they did not 
 
Figure 5.12 Landowners Attitudes Concerning Various Reasons that Influence Their Decisions 





know any of wetland restoration programs. More than half the landowner rated that ‘financial 
incentive’ was very important. About 42% reported ‘long-term contract’ as being very important 
factor in their decision to participate in restoration program. Almost a third of response indicated 
that the reason ‘too complicated to apply’ was very important and 38% of the respondents rated 
that ‘using the land for other purpose’ was also a very important factor for enrolling a restoration 
program. Following this question, the landowners were asked to indicate the importance of the 
following current or pending policy instruments in regards to wetland restoration in coastal 
Louisiana. The listed policy instruments include: (1) public land purchases; (2) public purchase 
of permanent or temporary conservation easements; (3) establishing new markets for land; (4) 
implementing innovative tax incentive programs; (5) subsidies for plant, fish, and wildlife 
management; and (7) conservation cost sharing arrangements.32 As shown in Figure 5.13, the 
most preferred policy instruments were implementing innovative tax incentive programs and  
 
Figure 5.13 Landowner’s Preference for Various Policy Instruments in Regards to 
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subsidies for plant, fish, and wildlife management (47% of the respondents rated both options as 
very important). The second most preferred instrument was conservation cost sharing 
arrangements, with 46% of the respondents rating cost sharing as very important. Public 
purchase of permanent or temporary conservation easements was also popular, with about 37 % 
of the respondents indicating that this policy instrument was very important. Somewhat less 
popular were public land purchases and establishing new markets for land. About 33% and 31% 
of the respondents rated these two policy instruments were very important, respectively.  
5.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented survey design and descriptive statistics of the data set. The 
data set will be used to analyze landowner’s decision to participate in income-generating 
activities and the level of participation from their wetland parcels in Chapters 6. Coastal parishes 
in Louisiana were initially selected for this study and five parishes were selected among 20 
coastal parishes due to data limitation. The final mailing list contained a total of 941 wetland 
parcels. The household survey covered detailed information on the physical characteristics of 
wetland parcels. This includes ownership type and percentage, property size, wetland types, 
current land use for any commercial-based activities, total revenue derived from commercial-
based activities, and a range of questions about the respondents’ participation of government-
sponsored wetland restoration programs and perspectives. Landowner’s socioeconomic and 
demographic information were also collected including age, gender, race, income, education, 
annual household income, favorite outdoor activities, and effort in environmental protection. The 
description of the survey data provided in Section 5.2 and 5.3 are useful for providing a context 




response and explanatory variables will be discussed in Chapter 6. The next chapter uses this 


















CHAPTER 6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an application of Cragg’s (1971) double-hurdle model to analyze 
the decision among landowners whether or not to participate in income-generating activities on 
their respective coastal wetland parcels and, if so, the intensity of participation. In Chapter 4, the 
standard and generalized Tobit models were outlined for comparison purposes. The assumption 
is made within the standard Tobit model that landowners make two decisions simultaneously: (1) 
whether to participate and (2) the level of participation. The assumption associated with the 
generalized Tobit model, on the other hand, is that landowners make the decisions in a two-stage 
process where in the first stage landowners make the decision whether or not to participate in 
income-generating activities and only after this decision is made do they then determine the level 
of participation. As such, the double hurdle model entails a sequential two-stage framework and 
considers the probability of zero level of income from potential participants in the second stage. 
The key difference between these models is whether zero observations arise solely from non-
participation or from either non-participation or participation but non-consumption in the first 
hurdle stage. Jones (1989) and Garcia and Labeaga (1996) have found that the sequential two-
stage decision-making process more accurately reflects households’ behavior. Since the 
sequential decision-making process incorporates both censoring and selection mechanisms, the 
double-hurdle model is, in general, a more flexible modelling framework than the standard and 
generalized Tobit models. Dedah (2010) compared the standard Tobit model and double-hurdle 
model to determine the characteristics of Louisiana coastal wetland owners, including their risk 




properties, attitudes toward various government incentive programs, and their general 
socioeconomic profile using household survey data. He found that the double-hurdle model 
statistically outperformed the standard Tobit model. Wodjao (2007) compared the standard and 
generalized Tobit models against the double-hurdle model to determine the factors influencing 
the use of computer and internet at home using American Time Use survey data. The author 
found that the double-hurdle model is the best econometric specification when compared to the 
standard and generalized Tobit models. 
The empirical results of the double-hurdle model associated with the objectives outlined 
in Chapter 1 are presented in this Chapter. In Section 6.2, a brief summary of the key variables 
used in the analysis is presented. Model specification is discussed in Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 
presents the results of double-hurdle model along with relevant discussion associated with these 
results. Empirical simulation is presented in Section 6.5 while a brief summary is provided in the 
final section. 
6.2 Potential Variables 
The following section defines the response and potential explanatory variables for the 
econometric models employed in the current analysis. A list of response and explanatory 
variables utilized in this study are provided below and descriptive statistics of these variables are 
reported in Table 6.1. 
6.2.1 Response Variables 
 Income-generating activities participation is represented by a binary variable (𝑑𝑖
∗) equal to 




Table 6.1 Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev 
Response Variables   
Income-generating activities 
participation 
Participate=1; Else=0 0.41 0.49 
Level of income ($) Continuous 12,204 13,657 
Explanatory Variables     
Socioeconomic/Demographic 
Characteristics 
   
Gender Male=1; Female=0 0.66 0.47 
Race White=1; Else=0 0.97 0.18 
Age 54 years old or younger=1; Else=0 0.15 0.36 
Education Some college degree and above =1; 
Else=0 
0.72 0.45 
Household income ($)    
    Household_income_1 Under $60,000=1; Else=0 0.21 0.41 
    Household_income_2 $60,000 - $99,999=1; Else=0 0.40 0.49 
    Household_income_3 Over $100,000=3; Else=0 0.39 0.49 
Land ownership Sole ownership=1; Else=0 0.31 0.47 
Percentage of ownership Continuous 0.58 0.40 
Years of ownership Continuous 70.87 38.73 
Participating in government 
program 
Yes=1; No=0 0.10 0.30 
Participating in other commercial-
based activities 
Yes=1; No=0 0.14 0.35 
An active outdoor enthusiast Yes=1; No=0 0.65 0.48 
An environmentalist Yes=1; No=0 0.68 0.47 
    
    
Property Characteristics    
Southeast parish Terrebonne, Lafourche, and 
Plaquemines parish=1; Cameron and 
Vermilion parish=0 
0.66 0.48 
Hunting lodge/camp (%) Yes=1; No=0 0.11 0.32 
Active management (%) Yes=1; No=0 0.13 0.34 
Receive sub-surface revenues (%) Yes=1; No=0 0.37 0.49 
Land type    




    Land_type_two Parcels contain two land types=1; 
Else=0 
0.18 0.39 
    Land_type_three Parcels contain three land types =1; 
Else=0 
0.07 0.35 
Total acreage of freshwater marsh Continuous 734 1,409 




Table 6.1 continued    
Total acreage of salt marsh Continuous 62 205 
Total acreage of other type land Continuous 341 1,167 
 
and 0 otherwise. From the full sample (N=122), about 41% landowner participated in 
commercial-based activities.33 
  Level of income from income-generating activities is represented by a continuous variable 
(𝑡𝑖
∗), equal to income in dollars for landowner i. The average income among landowners 
who participated in commercial-based activities equaled $12,204 with a standard deviation of 
$13,657. 
6.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
Explanatory variables were categorized by the socioeconomic/demographic 
characteristics of the wetland owners and physical characteristics associated with the individual 
properties. Landowner characteristics included both socioeconomic and demographic variables 
as well as variables representing opinions held by the respective landowners. 
Socioeconomic/demographic variables included in the analysis are: (1) gender; (2) race; (3) age; 
(4) level of education; (5) household income; (6) land ownership; (7) percentage of ownership; 
(8) years of ownership; (9) whether the landowner is participating in a government-sponsored 
program on the property; and (10) whether the landowner is participating in other commercial-
based activities.34 Variables representing opinions held by the landowner include: (1) whether or 
not the landowner considers himself/herself to be an outdoor enthusiast; and (2) whether the 
                                                          
33 Commercial-based activities also called income-generating activities, include alligator harvest and/or waterfowl 
hunting. 
34 As mentioned in Chapter 5, other commercial-based activities include farming, shrimping, crabbing, grazing, 




landowner considers himself/herself to be an environmentalist. The physical characteristics of 
the property include (1) the location of the parcel; (2) the presence or absence of a hunting 
lodge/camp; (3) whether or not the property was actively being managed for waterfowl habitat in 
2015; (4) whether the property generates sub-surface revenues; (5) land types; and (6) total 
acreage of different land types.  
Socioeconomic/Demographic Characteristics Variables 
 Gender:  For purposes of analysis, gender was coded 1 if a respondent was male and 0 if 
female. The influence of gender on participation and the participation level, based on the 
literature review presented in Chapter 2, shows that, with notable exceptions, males are 
more likely to participate in government-sponsored programs. From this limited review, 
it was hypothesized that men are more likely to participate in income-generating 
activities on their wetland parcels and that income generated from these activities will be 
higher among males.  
 Race: For purposes of analysis, race was coded 1 if a respondent was white and 0 
otherwise. The influence of this discrete variable on whether to participate and the 
resultant income associated with this participation is unknown given that there is little 
consistency in previous studies. 
 Age: For purposes of analysis, age was coded 1 if a landowner was 54 years old or 
younger and 0 otherwise. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the influence of age on 
participation is not consistent across the examined studies. Parks and Kramer (1995), for 
example, found that involvement in wetland restoration programs by farmers increase 
with age. Söderqvist (2003), on the other hand, found that age had a significantly 




and Belcher (2011) pointed out that the age of the landowner does not seem to 
significantly influence the landowner’s decision to adopt wetland conservation. In this 
research, given the inconsistency among studies examining the influence of age on 
participation decisions, the expected relationship between age and participation/income in 
this study is unknown. 
 Education:  For purposes of analysis, education was coded 1 if a respondent had a college 
degree or higher and 0 otherwise. Previous studies suggest that education is an important 
factor influencing owner’s participation and income. Zhang et al. (2011), for example, 
found that landowners, with a higher level of education, were more likely to participate in 
the conversion of cultivated land to wetlands. Kraft et al. (1996) found that an increased 
probability of participation in the USDA’s Water Quality Incentive Program by those 
landowners who were more educated. Given the noted relationship between education 
and participation in previous studies, it was hypothesized for this study that there will be 
a positive relationship between education and the likelihood of participation in wetland-
generating activities as well as a positive relationship between education and the level of 
income from participating in commercial-based activities.  
 Household income: For purposes of this analysis, household income was categorized into 
three groups: (1) under $60,000; (2) $60,000 to $99,999; and (3) above $100,000. These 
three categories were treated as dummy variables, where the reference group is above 
$100,000. The influence of household income on participation is inconsistent in the 
studies reviewed in Chapter 2. Matta et al. (2009), for example, pointed out that 
landowners with higher incomes would be more willing to adopt the suggested forest 




negative impact on the decision to participate in Poyang lake wetland restoration. Given 
the inconsistency among studies examining the influence of household income on 
participation decisions, the expected relationship between household income and 
participation/income in this study is unknown. 
 Land ownership: For purposes of this analysis, land ownership was coded 1 if the 
landowner is a sole owner and 0 otherwise. Parks and Kramer (1995), for example, 
pointed that ownership was an important factor in the decision whether or not to 
participate in wetland restoration programs in the United States. The authors found that 
higher proportions of land operated by full or part owners were both more likely to 
become involved in wetland restoration programs. Kraft et al. (1996) also pointed out that 
private landownership plays an important role for landowners to participate in the NRCS-
sponsored WQIP and the authors found that there is a positive relationship between land 
ownership and the willingness to participate in incentive programs. It was hypothesized that 
landowners who are sole owners exhibit a higher probability of participating in income-
generating activities and receive more income from participation. 
 Percentage of ownership: For purposes of this analysis, percentage of ownership (defined 
as the percentage of the parcel owned by the landowner from the joint ownership) was 
treated as a continuous variable. The expected relationship between percentage of 
ownership and whether or not to participate in income generating activities is positive.   
 Years of ownership: For purposes of this analysis, years of ownership was defined as the 
number of years that the property in question was in family possession. The variable of 
years of ownership is an important factor related to the participation decision. Matta et al. 




adopt the suggested forest conservation practices. Based on the findings by Matta et al. 
(2009), the relationship between participation and years of ownership in the current study 
is expected to be positive. Similarly, a positive relationship between years of ownership 
and generated income from commercial-based activities is anticipated.  
 Participating in a government program: For purposes of this analysis, the variable 
participating in government program was coded 1 if the landowner participated in any 
state or federal wetland restoration program and 0 otherwise. While enrollment in a 
government program is hypothesized to influence the decision to participate in income-
generating activities, the expected relationship is unknown. 
 Participating in other commercial-based activities: For purposes of this analysis, the 
variable participating in other commercial-based activities was coded 1 if the landowner 
participated in any other commercial-based activities and 0 otherwise. While enrollment 
in other commercial-based activities is hypothesized to influence the decision to 
participate in income-generating activities, the expected relationship is unknown. 
 An active outdoor enthusiast: For purposes of this analysis, the variable an active outdoor 
enthusiast was coded 1 if the landowner considers himself/herself to be an outdoor 
enthusiast and 0 otherwise. While a variable of this nature was not included in any of the 
studies reviewed in Chapter 2, one might hypothesize that the landowner is more likely to 
use the property himself for waterfowl hunting if he considers himself to be an outdoor 
enthusiast. Hence, one can hypothesize a negative relationship between 





 An environmentalist: For purposes of this analysis, the variable an environmentalist was 
coded 1 if the landowner considers himself/herself to be an environmentalist and 0 
otherwise. The influence of this discrete variable on whether to participate and the 
resultant income associated with this participation is unknown.  
Property Characteristics Variables 
 Southeast parish: For purposes of this analysis, the variable southeast parish was coded 1 
if the wetland parcels located in the southeast coastal parishes (i.e., Terrebonne, 
Lafourche, and Plaquemines) and 0 for those in the Southwest (i.e., Cameron and 
Vermilion). In theory, the influence of this discrete variable on participation and income 
should be negligible if the model is well specified.  However, given that the quality of the 
wetlands in southwest parishes are generally recognized to be of higher quality and this 
quality is not considered in the analysis, one can hypothesize that participation and 
income generated from this participation is higher in the southwest parishes than in the 
southeast parishes.   
 Hunting lodge/camp: The variable hunting lodge/camp was coded 1 if hunting 
lodge/camp is available on the parcel and 0 otherwise. The presence of a hunting 
lodge/camp was hypothesized to positively influence the probability of participation and 
level of income from the participation.  
 Active management: The variable active management was coded 1 if the landowner 
actively managed his/her wetland property for waterfowl habitat and 0 otherwise.35 It was 
                                                          





hypothesized that active management would have a positive influence on participation 
and level of income from the participation.  
 Receive sub-surface revenue: The variable receive sub-surface revenue was assigned a 
value of 1 if a landowner received any sub-surface revenue from the parcel and 0 
otherwise. Whether receive sub-surface revenue from the wetland parcel was 
hypothesized to influence both the probability of participating in income-generating 
activities and subsequent income.  
 Land type: The variable land type was categorized into three groups: (1) Land_type_one 
denotes the property containing only one land type (i.e., freshwater marsh, brackish 
marsh, salt marsh, or ‘other’ land type); 36 (2) Land_type_two denotes the property with 
two types of land combination (i.e., property comprised of freshwater marsh and brackish 
marsh or property comprised of salt marsh and brackish marsh); and (3) Land_type_three 
denotes the property containing three types of land. These three categories were treated as 
dummy variables, where the reference group is Land_type_three. The influence of these 
discrete variables on whether to participate and the resultant income associated with this 
participation are unknown.  
 Total acreage of freshwater marsh: The variable total acreage of freshwater marsh was 
defined as the total freshwater marsh acres on the parcel and treated as a continuous 
variable.  Parcels used for income-generating activities included in this analysis averaged 
                                                          
36 Salt marshes are coastal wetlands that are flooded and drained by salt water brought in by the tides. Brackish 
marshes develop by salt marshes where a significant freshwater influx dilutes the seawater to brackish levels of 
salinity. A freshwater marsh is a marsh that contains fresh water. The majority of alligators inhabit freshwater. They 
can only handle being exposed to salt water for a small length of time, but will sometimes live in brackish water. 
These marshes provide vital food and habitat for several species of migratory waterfowl as well as offering shelter 
and nesting sites. ‘Other’ land type refer to non-wetland, including woodland, agricultural land, etc. in this research. 





734 freshwater marsh acres with a standard deviation of 1,408 acres (recall from the 
previous chapter that parcels less than 50 acres were purposely excluded from the 
analysis). It was expected that landowners who own larger freshwater marsh parcels were 
more likely to participate in commercial-based activities in 2015with the amount of 
income derived increasing with total parcel acres.  
 Total acreage of brackish marsh: The variable total acreage of brackish marsh was 
defined the total brackish marsh acres on the parcel being considered and is treated as a 
continuous variable. Parcels used for income-generating activities included in this 
analysis averaged 510 brackish marsh acres with a standard deviation of 1,345 acres. The 
expected influence of this continuous variable on participation is positive with the 
amount of income derived also being positive. Based on findings by Roberts et al. (1999), 
income derived with respect to brackish marsh acreage is expected to be less than that of 
freshwater marsh acreage.   
 Total acreage of salt marsh: As with fresh and brackish marsh, salt marsh (total acreage 
of salt marsh) was treated as a continuous variable. Parcels used for income-generating 
activities included in this analysis averaged 62 salt marsh acres with a standard deviation 
of 205 acres. While total acreage of salt marsh is hypothesized to influence the decision 
to participate in income-generating activities, the expected relationship is unknown.  
 Total acreage of ‘other’ type land: For purposes of this analysis, the variable total 
acreage of ‘other’ land type was defined the total non-wetland acres owned by the 
landowner and treated as a continuous variable. Parcels used for income-generating 
activities included in this analysis averaged 341 non-wetland acres with a standard 




benefits derived from agricultural land, the less likely to participate in wetland restoration 
programs. Based on this limited literature review, it was hypothesized landowners who 
owned ‘other’ type of land are less likely to participate in income-generating activities on 
their parcels and receive less amount income derived from these activities. 
6.3 Model Specification  
6.3.1 Econometric Specification 
The vector of coefficients (𝛽1 and 𝛽2 in Equations 15.1, 15.3, 19.1 and 19.3 as presented 
in Chapter 4) illustrate the effect on the participation decision and level of participation 
respectively, after estimating the Heckit model and the double-hurdle model. In Equations 15.1, 
15.3, 19.1 and 19.2, the vector of explanatory variables (𝑥1𝑖 ; 𝑥2𝑖 ) may contain the same 
common variables although their corresponding effects on the two hurdle equations might be 
quite different.  
Unlike the Tobit model, the choice of explanatory variables for participation and level of 
participation equations of the Heckit model and double-hurdle is complex. Cragg (1971) did not 
provide a choice theory concerning allocation of explanatory variables between the first and 
second stages for the double-hurdle model and there is no clear guidance regarding explanatory 
variables selection in each of stages. Pudney (1989) suggested that the first hurdle is 
unconnected with economic variables and instead arises from social characteristics factors. 
Newman et al. (2003) pointed to the fact that variable selection in both stages appears to be 
subjective and he suggested that the first hurdle is a function of non-economic factors that 
determine the household’s participation decision and that economic variables should be excluded 




to be associated with the landowner’s socioeconomic/demographic characteristics and the 
landowners’ opinions. The first stage of the process is also augmented with variables 
representing the physical characteristics of the parcel.  The level of income generated from 
commercial-based activities, the response variable in the second stage of the decision-making 
process, was assumed to be affected by physical characteristics of the property along with 
attributes of the landowner. 
Given little guidance as to (a) variables that might be relevant to the decision-making 
process and income-generating process and (b) which stage of the two-stage process would be 
more appropriate, the choice of explanatory variables for the first and second stage in the Heckit 
model and double-hurdle model were determined through a lengthy selection procedure. With 
the particular difficulty in the selection of variables, the choice of variable in each stage in most 
cases is somewhat arbitrary (Newman et al. 2003). Firstly, following Dedah (2010), the 
preliminary Probit and Tobit models were estimated using all potential explanatory variables. 
Then,  variables were  sequentially deleted until no further improvements  (based on significance 
level of remaining variables) in either the Probit model or the Tobit model (statistically 
significant at the 10% level or greater) were forthcoming. Then, comparing the results from the 
previous selection process, different combinations of variables from the list of explanatory 
variable were reintroduced in the Probit and Tobit models. Thus, the estimation results reported 
in this research are based on the final set of explanatory variables that had the most explanatory 
power with economic considerations.  
Specifically, the following variables were selected for the first stage of analysis (i.e., the 
participation decision): (1) age; (2) education; (3) household income; (4) land ownership; (5) 




activities; (8) an active outdoor enthusiast; (9) southeast parish; (10) hunting lodge/camp; (11) 
active management; (12) land type; (13) total acreage of freshwater marsh; (14) total acreage of 
brackish marsh; (15) total acreage of salt marsh; and (16) total acreage of ‘other’ type land. 
Similarly, the following variables were selected for the second stage of analysis (i.e., the level of 
participation): (1) age; (2) education; (3) land ownership; (4) years of ownership; (5) 
participating in government program; (6) southeast parish; (7) hunting lodge/camp; (8) active 
management; (9) land type; (10) total acreage of freshwater marsh; (11) total acreage of 
brackish marsh; (12) total acreage of salt marsh; and (13) total acreage of ‘other’ type land. 37 
6.3.2 Model Selection 
The Tobit model was estimated using the command ‘tobit depvar [indepvars1] [if] [in] 
[weight], ll[(#)] ul[(#)] [option]’ and the Heckit model was estimated using the command 
‘heckman depvar [indepvars1, select(depvar_s = varlist_s) [twostep]’ in Stata (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009). The parameter estimates for the Tobit model and the Heckit model with 
associated standard errors are reported in Appendix D and Appendix E, respectively. The 
double-hurdle model was estimated using Stata version 12 (StataCorp, 2012). The Stata 12 does 
not have built-in command to run the double-hurdle model. Thus, the log-likelihood function 
was estimated by creating a user written program using the command ‘craggit depvar1 
[indepvars1] [if] [in] [weight], second (depvar2 [indepvars2]) [option]’ in Stata, which is 
described by Burke (2009). To address potential misspecification errors, such as non-normality 
and hetroskedasticity, the standard errors were estimated using the robust option ‘vce (robust)’ in  
                                                          




Stata  (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).38 
To identify the model that best estimates the landowner’s participation decision and the 
level of income derived from this participation, two model specification tests (the likelihood ratio 
test and the Vuong test) were carried out for model selection (Table 6.2).39 First, the likelihood 
ratio test was employed to compare the Tobit model against the double-hurdle specification. In 
this research, the second hurdle equation of double-hurdle model is a nested version of the Tobit 
model if there is no separate participation equation. Thus, the null hypothesis is that the restricted 
Tobit model (which use all variable from second stage equation of double hurdle model) fit the 
data better. The results of LR test statistical value is 𝑥(3)
2 = 2.93 with a p-value equal to 0.40 
(Table 6.2) indicated failing to reject the null hypothesis and suggested the inadequacy of the 
univariate Tobit specification in modelling the landowner’s decision process and suggested that 
landowners make their decisions in a sequential manner (i.e., in the first stage, landowners make 
Table 6.2 Model Specification Statistical Tests 
Model comparison Test method Test value P-value Decision 
Double-hurdle model vs. Tobit 
model  
LR test 2.93 (3) 0.40 Reject Tobit model 
Heckit model vs. double-
hurdle model 
Vuong test 1.08 0.00 Reject Heckit model 
Note: The degree of freedom of the chi-square statistics in parentheses 
                                                          
38 Robust standard error is also known as heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, White-Huber standard errors, or 
sandwich estimators of variance. The procedure deriving robust standard error do not impose any assumptions on 
the structure of heteroskedasticity. This is very convenient because it means we can report statistics that work 
regardless of the kind of heteroskedasticity present in the population. Whether or not the errors have constant 
variance, it is safe to use the robust standard errors (Wooldridge 2015). 
39 Likelihood ratio (LR) test is a statistical test used to compare two nested models (the null model and the 
alternative model). Each of the two models are separately fitted to the data and the log-likelihood recorded. The LR 
test statistic is twice the difference in the log-likelihoods (i.e., 2[ln(likelihood for the full model-ln(likelihood for the 
reduced model)]). The test statistic is approximately a chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to dff-
dfr and the preferred model is determined by the probability of the test statistical value. The Vuong test is LR based 




the decision to participate in income-generating activities and then consider the desired level of 
income derived from this participation). Second, the Vuong test was used to compare the Heckit 
model against the double-hurdle model specification. The results of Vuong test statistical value is 
1.08 with a p-value equal to zero, indicating rejection of the Heckit model in favor of the double- 
hurdle model specification in terms of fit (Table 6.2). While the Vuong test showed that the 
double-hurdle model outperforms the Heckit model, it can also be explained by the maximum 
likelihood estimates. For example, variables: (1) education; (2) land ownership; (3) years of 
ownership; (4) total acreage of freshwater marsh; (5) total acreage of salt marsh; and (6) total 
acreage of other type of land were found to significantly influence (from a statistical point of 
view) the level of income derived from participating in income-generating activities in the 
double-hurdle model, but did not significantly influence the level of income in the Heckit model 
(Appendix E). 
The statistical tests and maximum likelihood estimates indicated that both the Tobit and 
the Heckit models are inadequate in explaining the behavior of landowners with the collected 
data and suggested that the decision to participate in income-generating activities and the desired 
level of income derived from this participation follow a two-step sequential decision process. 
Thus, the double-hurdle is the best specification to examine the factors that influence the 
likelihood of participation and the level of participation in this research.40 
6.4 Results of the Double-Hurdle Model  
The results in this section are given in two parts. First, maximum likelihood estimates are 
                                                          




presented and discussed. Second, in order to assess the impact of the explanatory variables on the 
respondent variable, marginal effects are calculated for both continuous and discrete variables.41 
6.4.1 Maximum Likelihood (ML) Estimates  
The maximum-likelihood estimates of the double-hurdle model are presented in Table 6.3 
with associated robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Estimates for the participation 
equation are presented in the second column of the table, while the estimates from the level of 
participation equation are presented in the third column. Significant variables in the first hurdle 
equation influence the decision whether or not to participate and can be interpreted as increasing 
or decreasing the likelihood of participation for income-generating activities.42 A significant 
variable in the second hurdle equation indicates an influence on the level of generated income 
and can be interpreted as increasing or decreasing income. Since the specification of the double-
hurdle model allows for zeros in the second hurdle equation, the estimates are based on both 
positive and zero levels of income. The discussion focuses specifically on the significant 
variables and their interpretation.  
ML Estimates of Socioeconomic/Demographic Characteristics Variables 
Age was found to statistically influence (from a statistical perspective) the likelihood of 
participation, but did not significantly influence the level of participation. The influence between 
the two stages was of an opposite direction. Specifically, landowners who are 54 years old or 
                                                          
41 Discrete variables can only take on two values, 0 and 1. The AME for discrete variables shows how P(Y=1) 
changes as the discrete variable changes from 0 to 1, holding all other variables at their means (Caudill and Jackson, 
1989). 
42 The explanation is that the focus of the analysis relates only to income-generating activities (i.e. alligator harvest 
and waterfowl hunting). For example, a significant negative coefficient should not be interpreted as implying an 




Table 6.3 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Double-Hurdle Model 
 First hurdle 
equation  
 












Household income   
    Household_income_one -0.41 
(0.58) 
_ 
    Household_income_two -0.20 
(0.51) 
_ 
    Household_income_three Reference group _ 




Percentage of ownership 1.02 
(0.92) 
 




Participating in government program _ -12156.48 
(11950.24) 





An active outdoor enthusiast -0.68 
(0.51) 
_ 
Property Characteristics   












Land type   








    Land_type_three Reference group Reference group 











Table 6.3 continued 














Wald x2 statistic 1726.19*** 
Log-Likelihood -341.51 
Number of observation 122 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses  
            Asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05 and * = 0.10 
younger were more likely to participate in income-generating activities.  
Education was not found to significantly influence the likelihood of participation but it 
did significantly influence the level of participation. Specifically, landowners, with a college or 
higher level of education, were found to receive more income from income-generating activities. 
This supported the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between education and the 
level of income. 
Land ownership (sole ownership) was found to significantly influence the likelihood of 
participation and the level of participation. Specifically, results indicated that sole-owners were 
less likely to participate in income-generating activities and received less income than 
landowners who own the wetland parcel through joint ownership or ‘other’ ownership structure. 
One might hypothesize that this finding reflects a time constraint for a sole owner that does not 
allow him to actively adequately monitor activities on the property, thereby, reducing the 






Years of ownership was found to significantly influence the level of participation, but did 
not significantly influence the likelihood of participation. Specifically, the longer the landowner 
owned the wetland parcel, the less income the landowner derived from commercial-based 
activities. 
Participating in other commercial-based activities was found to significantly influence 
the likelihood of participation. Specifically, landowners who participated in other commercial-
based activities were found to less likely to participate in alligator harvest and/or waterfowl 
hunting activities after controlling for other factors.  
ML Estimates of Property Characteristics Variables 
The presence of a hunting lodge/camp was also found to statistically influence the 
likelihood of participation, but did not significantly influence the level of participation. The 
influence between the two stages was of an opposite direction. Specifically, landowners who had 
a hunting lodge/camp on his/her wetland parcel were less likely to participate in income-
generating activities. 
Active management was found to positively and statistically influence the likelihood of 
participation but did not significantly influence the level of participation. Specifically, those 
landowners who actively managed their property for waterfowl habitat were more likely to 
participate in income-generating activities. 
                                                          
43 One might argue that the parcel acreage among sole owners is less than that among joint owners.  However, total 




Looking at the land type variables, the results showed that land_type_one significantly 
influenced the likelihood of participation, but did not significantly influence the level of 
participation. Specifically, landowners who own a wetland parcel with only one land type were 
found to more likely to participate in income-generating activities. While the estimated 
coefficients for land_type_two was found to not significantly influence (from a statistical 
perspective) the likelihood of participation and the level of income generated from participation. 
The variable total acreage of freshwater marsh was found to significantly influence 
(from a statistical perspective) the likelihood of participation as well as the level of income 
generated from participation. Specifically, an increase in acreage of freshwater marsh was found 
to result in an increase in participation rate as well as the level of participation (i.e., generated 
income from commercial-based activities). This finding was also found with respect to brackish 
marsh. Finally, the variable total acreage of other type of land was found to significantly 
influence the level of income derived from participation, but did not significantly influence the 
likelihood of participation. 
6.4.2 Marginal Effects (ME) Estimates 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, since the respondent variables from the double-hurdle model 
are latent, or unobservable, the maximum likelihood estimates cannot be interpreted in the same 
fashion as ordinary least square estimates. The maximum likelihood parameter estimates of the 
double-hurdle model provide an intuitive interpretation of the factors for determining 
landowner’s participation decision and the level of participation. Therefore, to fully understand 
the magnitude of the relationship between the explanatory and respondent variables, it is 




the estimated model. Based on different definitions of the expected value of the respondent 
variable 𝑦𝑖, three different marginal effects can be calculated.
44 The one of most interest is the 
unconditional expected mean (overall effect on the respondent variable) in this model. All of 
these marginal effects were estimated using Stata version 12 (StataCorp, 2012) and the reported 
standard deviations were estimated by using the ‘summarize’ command in Stata.  These standard 
deviations, however, describe only the data and should not be considered for inference on average 
partial effect. Therefore, the standard errors were computed using the delta method with the 
‘nlcom’ command in Stata for statistical inference (Su and Yen, 1996). 
The estimated marginal effects for these variables, along with their delta-method standard 
errors, are presented in Table 6.4. In this table, ‘Probability’ refers to the influence of a change in 
the level of an exogenous variable on the probability of participation. A positive value would 
imply an increase in the probability of participating in income-generating activities while a 
negative value would imply the converse. ‘Conditional’ denotes the level of participation (i.e., 
generated income) associated with a change in the level of any exogenous variable in the model 
conditional on participation and, as such, refers only to those landowners who participated in 
income-generating activities in 2015. A positive value would therefore indicate that landowners 
who received income derived from these activities would receive a higher amount of 
participation level (i.e., generated income) with an increase in the exogenous variable of interest 
and, vice versa, a decrease in the participation level if that exogenous variable is reduced. The 
‘Unconditional’ represents the unconditional effect of a change in the exogenous factor on the 
                                                          
44 The marginal effects referred to the average partial effects (APE), which is an estimate averaged across the sample 
observation. As descripted in Chapter 4, the marginal effects can be calculated by differentiating equations (23), 




Table 6.4 Marginal Effects with Respect to Continuous and Discrete Variables 
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Table 6.4 continued    








Notes: Delta-method standard errors are in parentheses  
            Asterisks indicate levels of significance: *** = 0.01, ** = 0.05 and * = 0.10 
level of generated income (i.e. the total effect) and refers to all landowners (i.e., those who 
participated in income-generating activities as well as those who did not). Thus, a positive value 
would indicate an increase in the participation level (i.e., generated income) across all 
landowners including landowners with zero income from these activities. 
It is important to recognize the different interpretations of marginal effect for discrete and 
continuous variables under the probability, conditional, and unconditional headings in Table 6.4. 
When the value of a discrete variable changes from zero to one, the discrete effect represents the 
percentage change in the probability of participation on the probability marginal effect, and it 
represents the absolute changes in the conditional and the unconditional level of income. For 
continuous variables, the marginal effect represents the unit change in the response variable for a 
unit change in the explanatory variable. 
ME of Socioeconomic/Demographic Characteristics Variables 
The estimates in Table 6.4 indicated that the probability of engaging in income-
generating activities was not significantly influenced by the age of the landowner. The estimated 
conditional effect was, however, statistically significant and negative (Table 6.4, column 3). 
Specifically, the marginal effect with respect to age suggested that conditional on participation, 
landowners who are less than 55 years old were found to receive $2,789 less income from 




significant, the estimated unconditional effect was not found to significantly influence the level 
of income derived from participation. 
The marginal effects with respect to education were positive with respect to both the 
conditional and unconditional effects but insignificant with respect to the probability (Table 6.4, 
column 2). The positive and statistically significant marginal effects indicated that education 
plays an important role on the conditional and the unconditional level of participation (i.e., 
generated income from commercial-based activities). Specifically, conditional on participation, 
landowners with more formal education were found to receive $9,955 more income from income 
generating activities then landowners with less formal education (Table 6.4, column 3). The 
unconditional marginal effect (Table 6.4, column 4) indicated that more educated landowners 
were found to receive $4,995 more income from commercial-based activities, on average, than 
those landowners with less formal education.  
The marginal effects with respect to land ownership (sole ownership) were all negative 
but insignificant on the probability (Table 6.4, column 2). The negative and statistically 
significant marginal effects indicated that land ownership plays an important role on the 
conditional and the unconditional level of participation. Specifically, conditional on 
participation, sole-owners were found to receive $11,830 less income than landowners who own 
the wetland parcel through joint ownership or ‘other’ ownership structure (Table 6.4, column 
3).45 Given the negative effect on conditional level and negative but insignificant effect on 
probability, the net effect on unconditional income is (negatively) significant and equal to $6,508 
(Table 6.4, column 4). One might hypothesize that the negative effect of sole ownership on 
                                                          
45 There is a relatively high correlation between ‘sole ownership’ and ‘percentage of ownership’, as one would 




income reflects time constraints among sole owners. Specifically, leasing of property for 
waterfowl and/or alligator hunting may require monitoring and other activities to ensure that 
lessees are abiding by the agreed upon rules of use. Time constraints for a sole owner may 
exceed those in a ‘partnership’ where the various owners can ‘split’ monitoring and other 
activities. Another argument that may be advanced is that the fair market value of more 
productive properties exceeds that of less productive properties and, as such, would sell for more 
in the market place. This being the case, a higher amount of capital may be required to purchase 
more productive properties which, in turn, increase the probability of a partnership. 
The negative and statistically significant marginal effects indicated that years of 
ownership plays an important role on the conditional and the unconditional level of participation. 
Specifically, conditional on having made the decision to participate in income-generating 
activities, the landowner would receive $64 less income associated with each additional year of 
ownership (Table 6.4, column 3). The unconditional marginal effect indicated that for each 
additional year of ownership, the landowner would receive $30 less income, on average (Table 
6.4, column 4).  
The marginal effect with respect to participating in government program indicated that 
whether to participate in government-sponsored wetland restoration programs plays a negative 
and significant role on the conditional and unconditional level of participation. Specifically, 
conditional on participation, landowners who participated in government-sponsored wetland 
restoration programs were found to receive $3,049 less income than other landowners (Table 6.4, 
column 3). The unconditional marginal effect indicated that landowners who participated in 
government-sponsored wetland restoration programs were found to receive $1,506 less, on 




program (Table 6.4, column 4). This finding may reflect commercial restrictions placed on 
acreage upon enrollment in government programs. This is the case, for example, with acreage 
enrolled in the CRP and WRP programs. 
The marginal effect with respect to participating in other commercial-based activities 
indicated that landowners who participated in other commercial-based activities have a 55% 
lower probability of participating in income-generating activities (Table 6.4, column 2). While 
the unconditional marginal effect was not found to significant influence the level of income 
derived from participation (Table 6.4, column 4).  
ME of Property Characteristics Variables 
The marginal effect with respect to southeast parish indicated that the location variable 
(southeast parish) plays a negative and significant role on the conditional level of income but not 
on the probability of participation and unconditional level of income derived from participation. 
Specifically, the conditional marginal effect indicated that landowners who own wetland parcel 
in southeast of Louisiana were found to receive $1,842 less income (Table 6.4, column 3). This 
suggests that location was an important factor in determining the level of income but did not 
affect the decision whether or not to participate in income-generating activities. The ‘poorer’ 
quality associated with wetlands in the Southeast vis-à-vis Southwest may explain this finding. 
The hunting lodge/camp variable exerted opposite effects on probability and the level of 
participation. With a negative and insignificant sign on probability, landowners who had a 
hunting lodge/camp on his/her wetland parcel have a 20% lower probability of participating in 
income-generating activities (Table 6.4, column 2). The conditional marginal effect indicated 




$3,446 more income than other landowners (Table 6.4, column 3). However, given the positive 
effect on conditional level dominates the negative but insignificant effect on probability, the net 
effect on unconditional income is positively insignificant and equal to $747 (Table 6.4, column 
4).  
The marginal effects with respect to active management was positively and statistical 
significant on the probability, but did not significant on the conditional and unconditional levels. 
Specifically, the results indicated that landowners who actively managed their wetland parcel for 
waterfowl habitat were more likely to participate in income-generating activities (Table 6.4, 
column 2).  
The marginal effect with respect to land_type_two was positive and statistically 
significant on conditional and unconditional level of income. Specifically, the conditional 
marginal effect indicated that landowners who own a parcel containing two land types (i.e., 
property comprised of freshwater marsh and brackish marsh or property comprised of salt marsh 
and brackish marsh) were found to receive $4,709 more income than other landowners who own 
a parcel containing three land types (Table 6.4, column 3). The unconditional marginal effect 
indicated that landowners who own a parcel containing two land types were found to receive 
$2,378 more income, on average, than landowners who own a parcel containing three land types 
(Table 6.4, column 4). Furthermore, the positive but insignificant marginal effect on the 
probability of participation suggested that landowners who own a parcel containing two land 
types would be more likely to participate in income-generating activities than other landowners 




The marginal effect with respect to total acreage of freshwater marsh indicated that 
freshwater marsh plays a positive and significant role on the conditional level of income derived 
from participation, but not on the probability of participation and unconditional level of income. 
Specifically, the conditional marginal effect indicated that a one acre increase in freshwater 
marsh translates into an increase in income of $2.97 more income (Table 6.4, column 3). 
However, the positive but insignificant marginal effect on the probability of participation 
suggested that if a landowner owns one more acre of freshwater marsh, he/she would have a 
0.04% more chance in participating in income-generating activities (Table 6.4, column 2). The 
positive but insignificant marginal effect on the unconditional level of income showed that if 
freshwater marsh increase one acre, the landowner would receive $3.08 more income, on average 
(Table 6.4, column 4). 
The marginal effects with respect to total acreage of brackish marsh were all positive but 
insignificant on the probability of participation (Table 6.4, column 2). Specifically, conditional 
on participation, landowners would receive $1.46 more income per additional acre of brackish 
marsh (Table 6.4, column 3). The unconditional marginal effect (Table 6.4, column 4) indicated 
that landowners would receive $1.22 more income from commercial-based activities, on average, 
as brackish marsh increased by one acre.  
Finally, total acreage of other type land were characterized by positive and significant 
marginal effects of conditional and unconditional levels. Specifically, the conditional effect 
indicated a $3.42 increase in revenue for each additional acre of other land type (Table 6.4, 
column 3). The unconditional marginal effect indicated that if other type of land increase one 




6.5 Empirical Simulation 
In this research, the final sample is represented by 122 observations. One concern is that 
the small sample size may result in a lack of statistical representation of the population and result 
in estimates that are inconsistent. Given the small sample size, therefore, an empirical simulation 
(resampling) was conducted based on the existing dataset to determine the extent to which the 
linear double-hurdle model fits the data (i.e., whether the distributions are centered on the true 
value; implying unbiased estimates). Like the Monte Carlo simulation which is a computerized 
mathematical technique that involves using repeated random sampling to generate simulated data 
and used with a mathematical model to solve problems, the basic idea of empirical simulation is 
based on the data generating process (DGP) and estimate the DGP parameters under some 
assumptions (e.g., type of distribution) (Cameron and Trivedi 2009).  
It is assumed that the distribution of the estimators tends to concentrate at the true 
parameter values with an increasing sample size (Qusshim et al. 2016). The double-hurdle model 
was evaluated using the empirical simulation. Following Moffatt (2015), the data generating 
process is as follows: 
First equation 
𝑑𝑖
∗ = 1 + 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 3 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 3 ∗ ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒1 + ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒2
+ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 2 ∗ 𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑓𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 3 ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
− 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 4 ∗ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑑𝑜𝑜𝑟𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛 + 2 ∗ 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ + 2
∗ ℎ𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑒 + 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 3 ∗ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒1 + 4 ∗ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒2







∗ = 1 + 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒 + 3 ∗ 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 + 3 ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
+ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚  + 2 ∗ 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑠ℎ + 2 ∗ ℎ𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑑𝑔𝑒
+ 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 3 ∗ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒1 + 4 ∗ 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒2 + 3 ∗ 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑓
+ 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑏 + 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 2 ∗ 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑜 + 𝑣𝑖;  𝑣𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) 
(36) 
By the definition of double-hurdle model, the error 𝑢𝑖 is independent of the regressors 
and has a mean of zero, variance of one in the first stage decision equation. The error 𝑣𝑖 is 
independent of the regressors and normally distributed in the second stage decision equation. To 
check the sensitivity of the estimation procedure, the random and arbitrary numerical coefficients 
were chosen for each variable in DGP Equations 35 and 36 as the ‘true’ values. Based on the 
data set of 122 observations, different sample sizes (n=250, 500, and 1000) were drawn and 
estimated. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009), the simulation estimates of 𝐸(𝛽?̂?) is the 
estimated coefficient ( 𝛽?̂?
̅ = (1 𝑁)⁄ ∑ 𝛽?̂?
𝑁
𝑛=1 ) and the simulation estimates of 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝛽?̂?) is the 
estimated variance (𝑠
𝛽?̂?
2 = (1 (𝑁 − 1)⁄ ) ∑ (𝛽?̂? − 𝛽?̂?
̅𝑁
𝑛=1 )). The null hypotheses is that in each 
simulation, the estimated coefficients are equal to the ‘true’ value (i.e., 𝐻0: 𝛽𝑗 = ′𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒′ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) 
and the alternative is that in each simulation, the estimated coefficients are not equal to the ‘true’ 
value (i.e., 𝐻𝑎: 𝛽𝑗 ≠ ′𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑒′ 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒). A two-tailed t test was used to check the outcome of 
𝐻0 𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡 𝐻𝑎 at the level or nominal size of 0.05 (i.e., the rejection rate, which is the 
proportion of simulations that lead to a rejection of 𝐻0 and this proportion is the simulation 




For each sample size, the average of estimated parameters, the standard deviation (std. 
dev), the average of asymptotic standard error (std.err), and the rejection rate (rej. rate) were 
calculated and are presented in Appendix G. For example, 𝛽𝑎𝑔?̂?
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 1.990 in first equation over 
the 250 estimates, which is very close to the DGP value 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 2.0. The simulation yields a 
95% confidence interval for 𝐸(𝛽𝑎𝑔?̂?) of [1.434, 2.532]. This interval is quite wide and includes 
2.0 suggesting that the estimator is unbiased. The results shows that the mean of estimated 
parameters are close to the ‘true’ value of the DGP in all scenarios as the sample size increases 
suggesting the estimated parameters of the double-hurdle model are asymptotically unbiased and 
consistent. The 𝑠𝑒𝛽𝑎𝑔?̂?
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ equals to 0.294 in first equation over the 250 estimates and the 95% 
confidence interval for 𝑠𝑒(𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒 )̂ is [0.289, 0.295]. Since this interval includes 𝑠𝑒(𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒)̂ =
0.294, there is no evidence shows 𝑠𝑒(𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒)̂ is biased for 𝜎𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒)̂ . The mean of the asymptotic 
standard errors are close to the standard deviation of estimated parameters suggesting the error 
variance is unbiased and consistent. The average rejection rates are converge to 5% suggesting 
that there are no significant biases and the asymptotic distribution is approximating the finite-
sample distribution in all situations. These simulation results indicated that the large sample 
theory provides a good approximation to the finite sample distribution.  
While the empirical simulation could be used to check if a model fit the data well or not, 
as with other mathematical models, it also has its limitations. The advantage of this empirical 
simulation is based on the data generating process and estimate the DGP parameters under some 
assumptions, this is also its limitation in the sense that assumptions need to be fair. Simulations 
can lead to misleading results if inappropriate assumptions and inputs are entered into the model. 




with the error term from the second equation. When dependency is considered to the analysis, it 
may present another possible result if correlation between two errors is assumed and the 
necessary adjustments should be made if the results that are generated seem out of line. While 
the empirical simulation does a fine job of illustrating the wide variance of possible results in this 
research, there are a number of unknown factors that cannot truly be accounted for.  
6.6 Summary 
This chapter examined the factors that determine both the probability of participating in 
income-generating activities and the level of income generated from the participation based on 
the household survey data through a bivariate approach. The LR test and the Vuong test were 
employed to compare the double-hurdle model against the Tobit and Heckit models and the 
results suggested that the double-hurdle model is the best econometric speciation to examine 
landowner’s participation decision and the level of participation. A landowner passes two 
hurdles (whether or not to participate in income-generating activities and level of income) to 
achieve a positive income value and landowners who participated in these activities might have 
zero level of income. Because the specification of the double-hurdle model allows for zeros in 
the second hurdle, thus, the double-hurdle model is able to process zero level of income 
problems and was carried out to address the issues involved in this research.  
The maximum likelihood estimates with robust standard error of the model generated 
both significant participation effects and level of income effects which provided a more thorough 
examination of the landowners participating decision in income-generating activities. The 
maximum likelihood estimation revealed that the likelihood of participation was determined by 




other commercial-based activities; (4) hunting lodge/camp; (5) active management; (6) 
land_type_one; (7) total acreage of freshwater marsh; and (8) total acreage of brackish marsh. 
The results also indicated that the level of income was determined by the variables: (1) 
education; (2) land ownership; (3) years of ownership; (4) total acreage of freshwater marsh; (5) 
total acreage of brackish marsh; and (6) total acreage of other type of land. 
An overall view of the parameter estimates through maximum likelihood procedure 
showed some notable differences in the participation and the level of income equations. First, the 
estimates of the effect of age, yeas of ownership, and hunting lodge/camp on participation and 
level of income showed different signs. Landowners who are 54 years old or younger were more 
likely to participate in income-generating activities but received less income than other 
landowners. The longer the landowner owned the wetland parcel, the more likely he/she was to 
participate in income-generating activities and the less income the landowner received from 
commercial-based activities. Landowners who had a hunting lodge/camp on his/her wetland 
parcel were less likely to participate in income-generating activities but received more income 
than other landowners. The results supported the assumption of the double-hurdle model that a 
factor might have different effects on the probability of participation and the level of 
participation (descripted in Section 4.4, Chapter 4). Second, the variables such as age, hunting 
lodge/camp, active management, and land_type_one were found to significantly influence the 
participation decision but did not significantly influence the level of participation. While the 
variables education, years of ownership, total acreage of other type of land were found to 
significantly influence the level of participation but did not significantly influence the 




and total acreage of brackish marsh were found to be significant in both participation equation 
and the level of income equation. 
To examine the impact of explanatory variables on the respondent variable, marginal 
effects were calculated for probability of participation, the conditional level of income, and the 
unconditional level of income. The results from marginal effect estimation revealed that the 
variables, participating in other commercial activities and active management were important to 
determine the likelihood of participating in income-generating activities. With the exception of a 
few variables (active management, land_type_one, and total acreage of salt marsh variables), the 
marginal effect estimation suggested that other variables (age, education, land ownership, years 
of ownership, participating in government program, southeast parish, hunting lodge/camp, 
land_type_two, total acreage of freshwater marsh, total acreage of brackish marsh, and total 
acreage of other type of land), were important determinants of level of income for those 
landowners who participated in income-generating activities. While the marginal effect 
estimation showed that the variables, education, land ownership, years of ownership, 
participating in government program, land_type_two, total acreage of brackish marsh, and total 
acreage of other type of land, were important determinants of the unconditional level of income 
(i.e. overall effect). 
It was found that more educated landowners who joint owned the wetland parcel (i.e., 
joint ownership through an undivided heirship or a corporation or trust) and own a parcel 
containing two land types were found to receive more income, on average. It was also found that 
landowners who own more brackish marsh and other type of land received more income, on 
average. One important determinant of level of income was participating in government 




were found to receive less income from commercial-based activities, on average. It also appeared 
that landowners who own a wetland parcel located in southeast area in coastal Louisiana and 
with longer ownership were found to receive less income. 
Next, looking at these common characteristic variables may be of interest when it comes 
to discussing potential impact of policy instruments which designed to encourage private 
landowners to participate in cost-sharing and other government-sponsored projects. The final 




















CHAPTER 7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
7.1 Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to develop and estimate an economically valid model 
that examines those factors that motivate private coastal landowners to participate in income-
generating activities from their coastal wetland property. The specific objectives included:  
1. Determine the characteristics of coastal Louisiana landowners, including their 
attitudes toward the use of their property for income-generating activities, the 
actual use of their wetland holdings as a source of income-generating activities, 
knowledge and opinions regarding cost-sharing programs, and their general 
socioeconomic profile;  
2. Determine the physical characteristics of the wetland properties, including type of 
wetland, total acreage of different marsh types, and presence of a hunting 
lodge/camp, etc.;  
3. Estimate, using a double-hurdle modeling approach, the importance of specific 
property and landowner characteristics on participation rates and the intensity of 
participation (i.e., the level of income-generating activities) in the two primary 
enterprises conducted on coastal Louisiana wetland properties (i.e., alligator and 
waterfowl hunting enterprises); and  
4. Based on results from the preceding objectives, assess the potential impact of 
policy instruments designed to encourage private landowners to participate in 
cost-sharing and other federally sponsored projects that would maintain/enhance 




A landowner’s decision is affected by a number of factors, including expected net returns 
from engaging in these activities, uncertainty as to the outcome of engagement, and an array of 
socioeconomic/demographic characteristics of the wetland owner and the physical characteristics 
of the property. The general decision process of private landowners can be divided into a two 
decision-making process. Landowners firstly decide whether to participate in income-generating 
activities and then consider the desired level of income derived from these activities. Since many 
observed level of income are zero, the linear regression ordinal least square procedures biased 
and inconsistent estimates.  
Although the traditional Tobit model could be used to handle data with many zeros, this 
model is very restrictive in its parameterization and considers only the dependent variable to be 
censored at zero and ignores the source of zero observations (Newman et al, 2003; Martinez-
Espineira, 2006). While the Heckit model use a two-stage estimation procedure to deal with zero 
observation, this model assumes that all zero observations are only from first hurdle. The double-
hurdle model, however, allows for the zero observation to be affected by both participation and 
the level of participation decision. In Chapter 6, the standard and generalized (Heckit model) 
Tobit models were used to compare the double hurdle model. The maximum likelihood 
estimates, the LR test, and the Vuong test were employed for these comparisons and the results 
indicated that the standard and generalized Tobit specifications were rejected in favor of the 
double-hurdle model specification. These results also suggested that landowners make their 
decision in a sequential decision-making process. A given landowner must first decide whether 
to participate in income-generating activities. Conditional on having made the choice to 
participate in income-generating activities, the second stage considers the desired level of 




participate in income-generating activities and level of income) to achieve a positive income 
value and landowners who participated in these activities might have zero level of income. 
Because the specification of the double-hurdle model allows for zeros in the second hurdle, this 
model is able to process zero level of income problems and was carried out to address the issues 
involved in this research. In summary, this research applied the Cragg’s double-hurdle model to 
determine landowner characteristics and physical property characteristics that affect participation 
(whether the landowner participates in income-generating activities) and level of participation 
(e.g., income generated from these activities).  
The double-hurdle model with independence was applied to identify the determinants on 
the participation and level of participation in income-generating activities using the survey 
questionnaire data. The double hurdle results, based on the estimated parameters and marginal 
effects, confirmed that decisions to participate in income-generating activities and the level of 
income are related to physical characteristics of the property and socioeconomic/demographic 
characteristics of the landowner. In particular, land ownership, total acres of freshwater marsh, 
and total acres of brackish marsh were found have a major impact on respondent variables based 
on maximum likelihood estimation. As expected, total acreage of freshwater marsh was 
positively related to probability of participation and the level of participation. An increase in 
freshwater marsh acreage serves to increase the likelihood of participation in income-generating 
activities and an increase in t income. The maximum likelihood and marginal effect estimates 
showed that landowners who own the parcel through joint ownership (i.e., joint ownership 
through an undivided heirship/a corporation or trust) or ‘other’ ownership structure are more 
likely to participate in income-generating activities and would receive more income, on average. 




determining a landowner’s level of income. Landowners who participated in government 
wetland restoration programs were, on average, found to receive less income from income-
generating activities than non-participating landowners. Landowners who owned a parcel 
containing two land types (i.e., property comprised of freshwater marsh and brackish marsh or 
property comprised of salt marsh and brackish marsh) received more income than other 
landowners who own a parcel containing three land types, on average. Additional factors, such 
as age, education, land ownership, years of ownership, participating in government program, 
southeast parish, hunting lodge/camp, land_type_two, total acreage of freshwater marsh, total 
acreage of brackish marsh, and total acreage of other type of land were found to be important 
factors to determine the intensity of participation (i.e. level of income).46 
7.2 Limitations and Further Research 
 Data Selection and Availability 
The sample of data was drawn from five parishes (Cameron, Vermilion, Terrebonne 
Lafourche, and Plaquemine parishes) among 20 coastal parishes in Louisiana. Although every 
effort was made to obtain all available data for econometric investigation in this research, the 
amount of data used for descriptive and empirical statistical analysis is limited. As information 
from other parishes becomes available, the analysis could be expanded to include these parishes. 
This would yield a larger database from which to conduct analysis.  
 Alternative Models  
The maximum likelihood estimates, the LR test, and the Vuong test suggested that the 
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double-hurdle model is the best specification to determine the factors affecting participation and 
the level participation decisions at both stages when compared to the standard and generalized 
(Heckit model) Tobit models. This research employed the Cragg’s double-hurdle in which the 
first hurdle use a Probit model and a truncated normal model in the second hurdle. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, there are no restrictions on explanatory variables implying the double-hurdle model 
could be determined by different vectors of explanatory variables in each hurdle. Since the 
Cragg’s double-hurdle model assumes independence for error distribution, there is an implication 
that the results could be sensitive to model misspecification. Thus it would be desirable to 
explore dependent double-hurdle model and Box-Cox double-hurdle models for further research. 
The study shows that there is an insignificant negative relationship between household 
income and the likelihood of participation in the first hurdle of the double-hurdle model. 
However, income derived from commercial-based activities are part of annual household income 
even if it accounts for only a small part of household income and annual household income may 
correlated with other variables and the error term in the first hurdle, which would imply the 
potential omitted variable bias (endogeneity). An interesting further research could be conducted 
by introduce an instrumental variable into the first hurdle equation.  
 Consideration of Large Landowners and Different Enterprise 
This research stratified landowners into three groups based on the number of wetland 
parcels they owned using the 1,159 wetland parcels as the sample frame and the survey 
questionnaires were mailed to landowners who own one or two wetland parcels.47  An 
alternative, more comprehensive estimation of landowner participation in income-generating 
                                                          




activities and level of income would include all landowners. This study combined both alligator 
and hunting enterprises data set and examined those factors that motivate private landowners to 
participate in these activities and the factors that affect the level of income derived from these 
activities. Separate double-hurdle models that examine alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting 
separately may also prove useful in some future study. 
7.3 Policy Recommendations 
The results from this research showed that only a few landowners participated in state or 
federal wetland restoration programs. The main reasons that landowners did not enroll any 
government restoration programs are: (1) too complicated to apply; (2) don’t want long-term 
contract; (3) not enough financial incentive; (4) need the land for other purposes; and (5) other 
reasons. Not knowing about available programs was one reason given by landowners for not 
enrolling. With respect to current or pending policy instruments in regards to wetland restoration 
in coastal Louisiana, most landowners indicated a preference for the implementation of 
innovative tax incentive programs and subsidies for plant, fish, and wildlife management. Public 
purchase of permanent or temporary conservation easements were found to be less popular, 
followed by public land purchases.  
Understanding the various attitudes among landowners toward wetland restoration 
programs provides the opportunity for policy makers to better evaluate current and potential 
policies. Although limited findings from this research, the descriptive and empirical results 
presented in Chapter 5 and 6 have potential implications with respect to crafting wetland 




First, policy makers may consider establishing an education program geared toward the 
‘smaller’ (i.e., non-corporation) coastal wetland owners. Unlike corporations with large coastal 
property ownership, the opportunity costs of remaining abreast regarding restoration programs is 
likely large relative to expected benefits among many of the ‘small’ owners of coastal wetland 
parcels. Thus, any education program would need to be developed with this understanding in 
mind and tailored accordingly. 
Second, as recommended by Coreil (1995), policy makers might consider ‘speeding up’ 
and simplifying the application process and modifying restoration program contract terms. Many 
of the complaints were voiced about the application process and contract terms. Policy 
adjustments these issues might prove useful. 
Third, policy makers need to ascertain the types of incentives (financial and others) to 
entice private landowners to accept a wetland restoration project on their properties. Gaining the 
cooperation by the coastal landowners, however, is complicated by the fact that while the public 
benefits accruing from wetland protection and restoration projects are likely to be large, private 
benefits are likely to be small and, potentially, negative. If coastal restoration and management 
needs are to be met in Louisiana, public funds must be leveraged to private investment. 
Therefore, financial incentives are likely to play an important role in the decision-making 
process among coastal landowners whether or not to engage in coastal restoration activities. 
While these financial incentives are important, the potential value of non-monetary incentives 
should not be minimized. 
Finally, the analysis conducted in Chapter 6 indicates that there are myriad of factors that 




so, the desired level of income. One might try to tailor programs to these findings. For example, 
results indicated that landowners who participated in a state or federal restoration program would 
receive less income derived from income-generating activities than landowners who did not 
participated in these restoration programs. To the extent that these results are valid, one obvious 
program would be to compensate for any loss in income associated with enrollment in a 
restoration program. The results, however, also indicate that compensation requirements would 
vary along several socioeconomic factors as well as factors specific to the parcel in question. 
Compensation could be enhanced/reduced based on these factors. As pointed out in Chapter 2, 
not all policy instruments are equally effective in achieving desired social goals given the 
alternative enterprises and the influence of different property characteristics and socioeconomic 
characteristics on the income-generating potential of coastal property. Since private landowners 
with different situations are likely to exhibit heterogeneous preferences over a range of relevant 
land use alternatives, therefore, as suggested by Caffey et al. (2003), policy maker need to 
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APPENDIX B. WETLAND ECONOMIC SURVEY 
 
 





                                                                                                                         
I am writing on behalf of LSU AgCenter and the Louisiana Sea Grant to request your help with an important project. As part of a larger program, 
we are conducting a survey to understand why people participate in commercial activities (alligator harvest and waterfowl hunting) on their land 
and how we can improve future coastal restoration/maintenance programs in Coastal Louisiana. 
 
The following questionnaire will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. The information you provide us will be extremely valuable 
regarding potential policy instruments aimed at encouraging private participation in coastal wetland maintenance and restoration. 
 
Participation is strictly voluntary and you may refuse to participate at any time. WE ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR ANSWERS WILL BE 
COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. Moreover, the results of the survey will be only reported in a summary format, so again no one will link you 
to your responses. Please complete the attached questionnaire and return it in the self-addressed postage-paid envelope to us within the next TWO 
WEEKS. 
 
Thank you in advance for your cooperation. If you have any questions or need help with this survey, please feel free to contact us at: 
Phone number: 225-578-6296  
Email: walterk@lsu.edu or hwang23@lsu.edu 
 
Note: If you prefer to complete this questionnaire online, please provide your email address and parcel ID to Hua Wang at hwang23@lsu.edu and 
we will send the appropriate linkage to the questionnaire. 
 
Sincerely, 
Walter R. Keithly, Jr.                                                       Hua Wang  
Survey Project Leader                                                      Survey Project Assistant  
Louisiana Sea Grant                                                         Louisiana Sea Grant      





























Enclosed with this questionnaire is a wetland GIS map which according to parish records is identified as a parcel you own in the 
coastal zone. Later in this questionnaire we are going to ask you to focus on commercial activities associated with this parcel 
(alligator harvest or waterfowl hunting). And all of your answers will be kept strictly confidential and never associated with your 
name. 
 
Section 1: General Information 
1) Do you own the parcel on the map enclosed with this questionnaire? 
□  NO 
□ YES 
 
                          
 
 
2) How do you own the specific parcel?  
□ Sole ownership 
□ Joint ownership through an undivided heirship 
□ Joint ownership through a corporation or trust 
□ Other (please explain)______________________________________  
 
3) If you maintain joint ownership of the parcel, what is your ownership percentage? 
________ %  
 
4) Based on the enclosed GIS map, is the stated acreage correct? 
□  NO 
□ YES 
If no, what is your estimated of the correct acreage? 
________ acres  
5) Approximately how long has this parcel been in family possession?  
                ________ years 
 
6) Referring to the enclosed GIS map, what types of wetland do you own on this parcel? (Check the answer to all that 
apply) 
□ Salt marsh 
□ Brackish marsh 
□ Freshwater marsh 
□ There is no wetland on this parcel  
7) Do you use this property for any commercial-based activities? 
□  NO – If NO, please skip to question 14 
□ YES – If YES, please proceed to question 8 
 
8) Please indicate the commercial activity (activities) on this property? (Check the answer to all that apply) 
□ Alligator harvest (including egg collection) 
□ Waterfowl hunting 
□ Other (please specify)______________________________________  
 
9) What is the total number of acres of parcel you use for the following commercial activities? Please outline the area on 
the GIS map enclosed and select the type of wetland (check all boxes that apply)  
□ Alligator harvest: ________ acres 
     (□ Salt marsh; □ Brackish marsh; □ Freshwater marsh □ Other) 
 
□ Waterfowl hunting: ________ acres 
     (□ Salt marsh; □ Brackish marsh; □ Freshwater marsh □ Other) 
 
□ Other:  ________ acres  
     (□ Salt marsh; □ Brackish marsh; □ Freshwater marsh □ Other) 
 
10) Is there any hunting lodge/camp on the parcel? 
If No, please stop here, fold this booklet, place it 
in the prepaid envelope and drop it in the mail to 
prevent you receiving future mailings from us. We 
apologize for the inconvenience and will remove 
you from the mailing list. 




□  NO 
□ YES 
 
11) Do you actively manage your property for waterfowl habitat (e.g. water control, vegetation management through 




12) What was the revenue derived from the parcel in question from the following commercial activities in 2015? (Again, 
this information will be confidential)  
□ $ ________   Alligator harvest (including egg collection) 
□ $ ________   Waterfowl hunting 
□ $ ________   Other 
 
13) Do you receive any sub-surface (oil & gas) revenue from this parcel?  
□  NO  
□ YES  
14) Do you participate in any state or federal wetland restoration programs? 
□  NO  
□ YES  
14a). If YES, which program(s) do you participate in? 
□ Former Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) (Merged into Agricultural Conservation Easement 
Program in 2014 Farm Bill). 
□ Water Bank Program (WBP) 
□ Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA) 
□ Coastal Wetlands Planning, Preservation & Restoration Act (CWPPRA) 
□ Other (please specify)________________________________ 
 
                 14b). If NO, why do you not participate? How important were the following reasons for doing so? Check the 
appropriate box for each statement. 
Reasons for not participation 







Too complicated to apply □ □ □ 
Don’t want long-term contract □ □ □ 
Not enough financial incentive □ □ □ 





















15) How would you rate the following current or pending policy instruments in regards to wetland restoration in coastal 









Public land purchases 
□ □ □ 
Public purchase of permanent or 
temporary conservation easements 
□ □ □ 
Establishing new markets for land 
□ □ □ 
Implementing innovative tax 
incentive programs 
□ □ □ 
Subsidies for plant, fish, and 
wildlife management 
□ □ □ 
Conservation cost sharing 
arrangements 
□ □ □ 
 
Section 2: Demographics 
 
16) Which range includes your age? 
□ Under 25         
□ 25 – 34         
□ 35 – 44         
□ 45 – 54         
□ 55 – 64         
□ 65 or older 
 
17) What is your gender? 
□ Male          
□ Female 
 
18) What is your race? 
□ White 
□ Asian 
□ Native American 
□ Black/African American 
□ Latino/Hispanic 
□ Other (please specify)  _________ 
19) Which of the following best describes your total household pre-tax 2015 income?  
□ Under $20,000                 
□ $20,000 - $39,999 
□ $40,000 - $59,999 
□ $60,000 - $79,999 
□ $80,000 - $99,999 
□ $100,000 - $150,000 
□ Over $150,000 
 
20) What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
□ Less than High School          
□ High School Degree or equivalent     
□ Some College 
□ College Degree                      




□ Master Degree 
□ Doctorate 
 
21) Do you consider yourself an active outdoor enthusiast? 
□  NO  
□ YES  
 
If YES, what are your favorite outdoor activities?  
___________________________ 
 
22) Do you consider yourself an environmentalist? 
□  NO  
□ YES  
If YES, how would you rate your effort in environmental protection? Please circle the appropriate number (1 with no 




23) Finally, we welcome your opinion on any topics that might not have been adequately covered in this survey, please use 
the space below. Also, if you would like a copy of the final report, please provide an email address and we will send 


















                I want to thank you for your time and candid answers. You have been very helpful.  Please return the survey within the 




APPENDIX C. LEVEL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION  
Figure C.1 shows the level of income distribution that the landowners in the sample do 
not receive any income from income-generating activities and that the level of income varies 
among landowners that decide to participate.  
 


















APPENDIX D. RESULTS OF THE STANDARD TOBIT MODEL 
Table D.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Standard Tobit Model 
 Coefficient  
 




Age 8778.35** 4324.84 
Education 7512.26* 4233.29 
Household income   
    Household_income_one -2483.36 4427.66 
    Household_income_two -4289.36 3394.52 
    Household_income_three Reference group _ 
Land ownership -10404.49*** 3688.94 
Years of ownership -19.91 46.24 
Participating in government program 8040.89* 4515.86 
An active outdoor enthusiast -4222.99 3547.97 
Property Characteristics   
Southeast parish 2320.51 3416.91 
Hunting lodge/camp 1729.73 5017.29 
Active management 19873.58*** 5398.32 
Land type   
    Land_type_one 5589.34 6252.44 
    Land_type_two 6449.89 6675.75 
    Land_type_three Reference group Reference group 
Total acreage of freshwater marsh 5.92*** 1.59 
Total acreage of brackish marsh 5.66*** 1.83 
Total acreage of salt marsh -5.12 9.12 
Total acreage of other type of land 4.19** 1.90 
Constant -19550.11** 8516.53 
Sigma 10138.00 1294.59 
Likelihood ratio statistics 92.76 
Prob > chi-square 0.00 
Log-Likelihood -370.54 
Number of observation 122 




APPENDIX E. RESULTS OF THE GENERALIZED TOBIT MODEL 
Table E.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Generalized Tobit Model 












Household income   
    Household_income_one 0.05 
(0.44) 
_ 
    Household_income_two -0.45 
(0.38) 
_ 
    Household_income_three Reference group _ 




Percentage of ownership -0.12 
(0.72) 
_ 




Participating in government program _ 2085.43 
(4627.12) 
An active outdoor enthusiast -0.29 
(0.40) 
_ 
Property Characteristics   








Active management _ 9498.44 
(6447.50) 
Land type   








    Land_type_three Reference group Reference group 











Table E.1 continued   














Number of observation 122 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses  






































APPENDIX F. RESULTS OF THE EXPONENTIAL DOUBLE-HURDLE 
MODEL 
In the case of the conditional mean of the latent variable has an exponential form instead 
of a linear form, the exponential hurdle model can be used to determine the likelihood of 
participation and the level of participation. The exponential hurdle model was estimated using 
the command ‘churdle exponential depvar [indepvars1] [if] [in] [weight], select (varlists 
[,noconstant het(varlisto)]) ll[(#|varname) [option]’ in Stata 14. The maximum-likelihood 
estimates of the exponential double-hurdle model are reported in Table F.1 with associated 
robust standard errors reported in parentheses. In order to assess whether a linear double-hurdle 
or an exponential version is the best econometric specification, the Voung test can be applied to 
determine the exponential double-hurdle model versus the linear double-hurdle model. The test t 
value is 5.13 with a probability of zero. This result indicates that the linear double-hurdle model 
specification is favored over the exponential double-hurdle version.  
Table F.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Exponential Double-Hurdle Model 












Household income   
    Household_income_one -0.149 
(0.575) 
- 
    Household_income_two -0.0784 
(0.468) 
- 
    Household_income_three Reference group - 












Table F.1 continued   
Participating in government program - -0.503 
(0.441) 
An active outdoor enthusiast -0.663 
(0.435) 
- 
Property Characteristics   












Land type   








    Land_type_three Reference group Reference group 






















Wald x2 statistic 361.78 
Log-Likelihood -318.76 
Number of observation 122 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses  














APPENDIX G. EMPIRICAL SIMULATION 





First equation Second equation 
n=250 n=500 n=1000 n=250 n=500 n=1000 
Age 2 mean 1.990 2.009 1.999 1.967 1.996 1.999 
  std.dev 0.301 0.295 0.281 0.292 0.290 0.289 
std. err 0.294 0.290 0.285 0.289 0.288 0.287 
rej. rate 0.060 0.056 0.050 0.064 0.042 0.056 
Education 3 mean 2.990 2.993 3.005 3.011 2.993 3.005 
std.dev 0.227 0.226 0.215 0.211 0.205 0.199 
std. err 0.224 0.223 0.218 0.214 0.213 0.212 
rej. rate 0.040 0.052 0.049 0.032 0.042 0.053 
Household_income_one 3 mean 3.011 2.994 2.998 - - - 
std.dev 0.259 0.256 0.250 - - - 
std. err 0.260 0.259 0.248 - - - 
rej. rate 0.040 0.043 0.055 - - - 
Household_income_two 1 mean 1.009 1.004 1.002 - - - 
std.dev 0.212 0.202 0.200 - - - 
std. err 0.214 0.203 0.180 - - - 
rej. rate 0.046 0.048 0.052 - - - 
Land ownership 1 mean 1.011 0.995 1.003 0.982 0.994 1.003 
std.dev 0.359 0.337 0.332 0.221 0.219 0.215 
std. err 0.333 0.330 0.216 0.218 0.215 0.209 
rej. rate 0.088 0.036 0.052 0.056 0.048 0.050 
Percentage of ownership 2 mean 1.996 2.002 1.999 - - - 
std.dev 0.383 0.378 0.367 - - - 
std. err 0.379 0.373 0.370 - - - 
rej. rate 0.040 0.042 0.061 - - - 
Years of ownership 3 mean 2.999 3.001 3.000 2.999 2.999 3.000 




Table G.1 continued         
  std. err 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
rej. rate 0.066 0.056 0.053 0.032 0.038 0.060 
Participating in other 
commercial-based 
activities 
-1 mean -0.983 -0.994 -1.001 - - - 
std.dev 0.286 0.284 0.282 - - - 
std. err 0.283 0.282 0.279 - - - 
rej. rate 0.060 0.054 0.053 - - - 
Participating in 
government program 
1 - - - - 0.973 0.993 0.999 
- - - - 0.382 0.350 0.344 
- - - - 0.353 0.345 0.339 
- - - - 0.062 0.048 0.049 
An active outdoor 
enthusiast 
4 mean 4.015 3.992 4.001 - - - 
std.dev 0.220 0.215 0.208 - - - 
std. err 0.217 0.216 0.205 - - - 
rej. rate 0.044 0.060 0.045 - - - 
Southeast parish 2 mean 2.006 1.997 2.002 1.989 1.997 1.995 
std.dev 0.221 0.219 0.210 0.229 0.220 0.211 
std. err 0.216 0.214 0.208 0.214 0.213 0.212 
rej. rate 0.064 0.052 0.050 0.048 0.062 0.053 
Hunting lodge/camp 2 mean 2.031 1.968 2.006 1.984 1.996 1.999 
std.dev 0.404 0.394 0.373 0.378 0.350 0.340 
std. err 0.385 0.384 0.370 0.364 0.362 0.355 
rej. rate 0.076 0.066 0.040 0.048 0.048 0.050 
Active management 1 
 
mean 1.021 0.987 1.009 1.013 1.007 0.999 
std.dev 0.393 0.381 0.364 0.389 0.378 0.373 
std. err 0.383 0.374 0.372 0.374 0.372 0.371 
rej. rate 0.060 0.053 0.052 0.066 0.044 0.052 
Land_type_one 3 mean 3.023 2.982 2.987 3.013 3.001 3.000 
std.dev 0.409 0.406 0.393 0.413 0.393 0.386 
std. err 0.397 0.396 0.388 0.392 0.389 0.387 
rej. rate 0.064 0.056 0.052 0.045 0.054 0.052 
Land_type_two 4 mean 3.953 4.022 3.984 3.992 4.006 4.004 




Table G.1 continued         
  std. err 0.448 0.439 0.437 0.428 0.427 0.425 
rej. rate 0.062 0.060 0.050 0.044 0.055 0.054 
Total acreage of 
freshwater marsh 
3 mean 2.999 2.999 3.000 2.999 3.000 3.000 
std.dev 0.00015 0.00014 0.00013 0.00015 0.00014 0.00012 
std. err 0.00014 0.00013 0.00010 0.00014 0.00013 0.00011 
rej. rate 0.072 0.060 0.055 0.048 0.048 0.051 
Total acreage of brackish 
marsh 
1 mean 1.009 0.999 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 
std.dev 0.00015 0.00014 0.00013 0.00015 0.00013 0.00011 
std. err 0.00014 0.00013 0.00011 0.00014 0.00012 0.00010 
rej. rate 0.032 0.064 0.058 0.062 0.046 0.049 
Total acreage of salt 
marsh 
2 mean 1.999 1.999 2.000 1.999 2.000 2.000 
std.dev 0.00054 0.00053 0.00052 0.00056 0.00055 0.00052 
std. err 0.00055 0.00052 0.00049 0.00054 0.00053 0.00051 
rej. rate 0.020 0.062 0.042 0.032 0.060 0.055 
Total acreage of other 
type of land 
2 mean 1.999 1.999 2.000 2.001 2.000 2.000 
std.dev 0.00016 0.00015 0.00014 0.00016 0.00015 0.00013 
std. err 0.00015 0.00012 0.00010 0.00015 0.00013 0.00012 
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